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ABSTRACT
Chevron v. NRDC has stood for more than 35 years as the
central case on judicial review of administrative agencies’
interpretations of statutes. Its contours have long been debated,
but more recently it has come under increasing scrutiny, with
some—including two sitting Supreme Court Justices—calling for
the case to be overturned. Others praise Chevron, calling
deference necessary or even inevitable. All seem to agree the
doctrine is powerful and important.
This standard account is wrong, however. Chevron is not the
influential doctrine it once was and has not been for a long time.
It has been eroded from the outside as a series of exclusions have
narrowed its scope and has been hollowed out from the inside as
Justices have become ever more willing to find clear meaning in
statutes, thereby denying deference to agencies. In recent years,
agencies have won only a handful of statutory interpretation
cases, and none in more than four years. Only once since 2015
has deference been outcome-determinative. At the Supreme Court
level—though not, for now, in the circuit courts—deference is
dead. The once-crystal Chevron has turned to mud. As a result,
however, it is less likely to be formally overturned than widely
believed—critics of deference and of administrative power on the
Court would gain little. Instead, Chevron’s future is likely to be
one of further decline, at least in the short term. This has
implications for major policy areas like climate change, health
care, and immigration where regulatory policy is necessary and
challenges are likely to reach the Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative law is a delicate balance of power between Congress,
agencies, and the courts. Congress is ultimately in charge—the statutes
it enacts are agencies’ sole source of authority.1 But Congress acts only
*
Associate Professor, University of South Carolina. The suggestions and
encouragement of my colleagues, including but not limited to Shelley Welton, Derek Black,
and Josh Eagle, were crucial. Special thanks to C.F., without whose help this project would
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rarely and, when it does, leaves substantial gaps. The tasks of identifying
the scope of those gaps and defining the powers agencies have to fill them,
or not, are left to the courts and the agencies themselves. 2 In the modern
era, the central case defining this balance of interpretive power between
agencies and courts has of course been Chevron v. NRDC, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1984. 3 Chevron has been so influential for so long
because it crystallized a central question in administrative law—when
courts would defer to agency interpretations of statutes, replacing fuzzy,
multifactor standards with rule-like clarity, at least in a broad swath of
cases.4 Chevron’s reputation for influence is nearly unsurpassed in the
administrative law canon; Cass Sunstein elevated Chevron to the highest
of pedestals, calling it a “counter-Marbury, for the administrative state.”5
But at the Supreme Court level, Chevron now lacks the power and
predictability it claims to have—and may once have had—though it
probably never had the influence its reputation suggests. This decline in
Chevron’s influence dates back to at least the 1990s but has accelerated:
over the past five terms, agencies have won only three of fifteen statutory
interpretation cases, and in only one of those three did Chevron matter,
meaning the Court deferred to the agency’s interpretation. 6 Moreover,
Chevron appears under threat. Prominent judges and academics,
including two sitting Supreme Court Justices, have called for its

have been impossible to complete. Thanks also to Kent Barnett, Tejas N. Narechania,
William Yeatman, and many others for their comments and suggestions, large and small.
1. See Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency
Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1,
9 (2011) (“Skidmore and Armour established early on in the administrative era that
Congress plays the critical role of providing clear statutory meaning when it wishes to do
so, and binds both courts and agencies in that situation.”).
2. Id. at 19. Or, perhaps more precisely, these tasks are the province of interest
groups, bureaucrats, and other political actors acting within, exerting influence from
outside, and litigating against agencies.
3. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise,
and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 742 (2002); see also United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court now
resurrects, in full force, the pre-Chevron doctrine of Skidmore deference . . . whereby ‘[t]he
fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute . . . var[ies] with
circumstances,’ . . . The Court has largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with that test
most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want
to know what to expect): th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”).
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2074–75 (1990).
6. See data and discussion infra Section IV.B.
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reconsideration and possible rejection.7 Whether it will survive, and for
how long, is an open question.
As Michael Herz concluded almost five years ago, “[a]t this point, it
takes chutzpah to write about Chevron.”8 Nevertheless, since then debate
over Chevron, and predictions of its demise, seem to have increased in
volume. But perhaps there is room to say a bit more. I am not the first to
note Chevron’s decline. Among academics, Linda Jellum in 2007,9
Michael Herz in 2015,10 and Jonathan Adler in 2016, 11 among others,
have noted aspects of the decline of meaningful Chevron deference at the
Court. There are contrary views: Nicholas Bednar and Kristin Hickman
in 2017,12 and Adrian Vermeule in a 2016 book, 13 have argued that
deference retains vitality or is even inevitable. Christopher Walker and
Kent Barnett have documented that Chevron retains influence in the
lower courts, at least for now; 14 the claims made here are exclusively
about the doctrine’s present and future at the Supreme Court level,
though they may trickle down to lower courts over time.
This Article makes three new contributions to this literature. First,
it catalogs the role of Chevron at the Court in recent years; this evidence,
detailed in Part IV, lends support to the thesis that deference has
declined precipitously. Second, it adopts a model for understanding
Chevron’s rise and fall: Carol Rose’s metaphor of legal “crystals” and
“mud,” which predicts a cyclical pattern, from consolidation and
simplification to complexity and ambiguity.15 This model suggests
Chevron’s decline was probably inevitable. Finally, Part V makes and
justifies a prediction that despite its weakness, Chevron is unlikely to be
overturned, and suggests some plausible futures for the doctrine.

7. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
8. Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1867
(2015).
9. See generally Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy
to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007).
10. See generally Herz, supra note 8.
11. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983
(2016).
12. See generally Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1392 (2017).
13. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 168–69 (2016).
14. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2017).
15. See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577 (1988).
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At the Supreme Court level, Chevron’s ability to provide certainty
has been on the wane for more than two decades. To be sure, Chevron
remains a near-necessary citation in administrative law cases, retains a
central position in administrative law curricula, and persists as one of
the most well-known and cited cases in American law. But at the
Supreme Court level, Chevron today applies to an ever-shrinking range
of cases, has little impact on the outcome of cases to which it still applies,
and is of little use as a predictive tool for future disputes. In short,
Chevron’s crystal has turned to mud. Agencies before the Supreme Court
in recent years appear to receive little or no interpretive deference,
whatever Chevron says. In my view it is fair to say that deference is dead
at the Supreme Court, though it is worth noting that lower courts and
agencies do not seem to have followed, at least not yet.16
This erosion of Chevron’s rule-like character has been at times
explicit and at times implicit. First, the Supreme Court has established
a series of explicit carve-outs from Chevron’s scope. Agency
interpretations of criminal law, interpretations of statutes empowering
multiple agencies, and so-called “major questions,” among other classes
of cases, have been excluded from Chevron deference. Second, the Court
has at times given little more than lip service to Chevron’s deference
requirement, implicitly eroding its scope and reliability. These trends
have been present for a long time, perhaps all the way back to Chevron
itself. But they have accelerated in recent cases. Taken together, they
mean agencies are entitled to deference in a shrinking pool of cases, with
fuzzy boundaries, and that deference is weaker and more uncertain, even
when the Court purports to give it. In short, not only has the Court’s
interpretive deference to agencies declined over time, but also—and
possibly more importantly—the predictability and reliability of that
deference has declined as well.
But these developments do not mean Chevron is likely to be
overruled. That cannot be ruled out, but erosion of Chevron’s force and
clarity—its muddying—make it less likely, not more. The reasons why
are explored below, but they boil down to a simple idea: Why go to the
effort of overruling a case that is not very important anymore? The Court
has already shown Chevron is rarely an obstacle and, when it is, that its
scope can be shrunk, or its mandate weakened so as to render it toothless.
Chevron deference will continue to be cited when judges find it helpful or
convenient to do so, but its ability to decide cases is rapidly diminishing,
if it has not disappeared already. Perhaps one day Chevron will be

16.

See Barnett & Walker, supra note 14, at 1.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

446

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

WINTER 2021

[Vol. 73:2

replaced with a new deference rule, but for now the pressure appears to
be in the opposite direction—toward more doctrinal uncertainty, not
less.17
This is a positive claim, not a normative one. In the interest of full
disclosure, my view is that in the short term, Chevron’s decline will lead
to greater judicial involvement in policy matters, and I am not optimistic
that will lead to better results. In the longer term, whether muddying of
deference doctrine is good depends on how and when it recrystallizes
again, a topic I speculate about at the end of this Article. But I hope here
only to persuade that my positive claim is true—that Chevron is far less
meaningful than it is widely understood to be but is nevertheless likely
to survive—so that a normative debate over that claim and what should
follow can be had.
II. CHEVRON’S CRYSTALLINE FOUNDATION
Though Chevron is likely familiar to most readers, it is worth briefly
reviewing what it does. Federal administrative agencies are empowered
by Congress to do a wide variety of things: environmental regulation,
immigration enforcement, provision of benefits . . . the list is nearly
endless. The statutes by which Congress empowers agencies to do these
things are complex, and not everyone may agree about what they allow
or require agencies to do or refrain from doing; gaps are inevitable. To do
their work, agencies must try to fill these gaps. If their actions or
inactions are challenged in court, judges must then decide if the agency’s
interpretation of the statute is correct. Chevron is the most important in
a series of Supreme Court cases over at least seventy-five years dealing
with how much weight judges should give to the agency’s statutory
interpretation.
Chevron did at least two things. Its first and probably most wellknown effect was to shift power from courts to agencies by creating a
space within which judges were required to defer to agency
interpretations of statutes.18 Only if those interpretations contradicted
discernible and clear congressional intent, Chevron Step One, or
exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in Step Two, would judges be
permitted to replace the agency’s interpretation with their own. 19

17. Like any predictions about the Court, these depend on its ideological balance
remaining stable; if there are major personnel changes on the Court, all bets are off.
18. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 2074–75.
19. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 511–12.
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Chevron’s second innovation was to crystallize the law of deference to
agency interpretations, at least in part. Before Chevron, agencies were
treated more or less like any party before the court and given an
opportunity, but no more than that, to convince the judges of the wisdom
of their position.20 Chevron changed that—where before there were
standards, now there was a rule: defer to agency interpretations, at least
within some range of cases.21 These two changes wrought by Chevron are
inextricably intertwined; to the extent that Chevron shifted power from
courts to agencies, it was by giving agencies more certainty that their
interpretations would be upheld.
Chevron quickly became recognized as a major doctrinal shift in
administrative law.22 But in a broader sense, it was nothing new. Across
all areas of law, there is evolution from rules to standards and back or,
as Carol Rose described it in a seminal Article on the pattern in property
law contexts, from crystals to mud and back. 23 Rose’s framework is useful
not just because it is earthily evocative, but because it is far more precise
than the perhaps overexposed rules/standards dichotomy.24
To take one of Rose’s illustrations, the crystal caveat emptor rule has
been muddied by modern doctrines requiring disclosure of defects by
sellers and imposing an implied warranty of habitability on landlords. 25
But private parties have responded by sometimes including waivers of
these duties in contracts, reimposing the crystalline rule.26 Then, courts
or legislatures may respond by making certain duties nonwaivable, and
the pattern continues.
Both crystal rules and muddy standards have advantages, which
become more apparent the more the legal pendulum swings in the
opposite direction.27 Crystals make for settled expectations, allowing
20. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 211 (2006) (“[T]he
Skidmore decision suggested that courts would merely consult such agency interpretations,
considering whether they were long-standing, consistent, and well-reasoned.”).
21. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 511 (“Chevron . . . announced the principle that the
courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous terms of a statute
that the agency administers.”) (emphasis added).
22. See id. at 512; see also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 372 (1986).
23. See Rose, supra note 15, at 595 (drawing on the work of historian P.S. Atiyah to
suggest that law evolves from mud to crystal and back, cyclically).
24. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 380 (1985)
(suggesting that “much of legal discourse—including the very fanciest law-talk—might be
nothing more than the unilluminating invocation of ‘canned’ pro and con arguments about
rules and standards”) (alteration in original).
25. Rose, supra note 15, at 581.
26. Id. at 582–83.
27. See id. at 590–93.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

448

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

WINTER 2021

[Vol. 73:2

long-term planning and predictable outcomes.28 Muddy standards allow
for case-by-case determinations, taking account of unique circumstances.
They are less vulnerable to exploitation by bad actors who technically
comply with rules and are able to deal with unanticipated contradictions
or superseding concerns.29 The appeal of both leads to oscillation.30 Make
the rules too crystallized, and outlier cases will make muddying the
waters with exceptions very tempting. Then, as the rules are overlaid
with those exceptions and epicycles, decision costs go up and
predictability declines, making the case for “rationalization”—the reimposition of rules—though the new rules may be quite different from
the old.31 This description suggests that the move from crystals to mud
and back is endogenous, but external factors might come into play as
well.32 For example, pressure to change might come from perception that
some actors are taking advantage of current law, or that it does not
adequately protect groups or interests who lacked political power in the
past.33
Chevron fits this mud-to-crystal pattern well, even if it did not go all
the way. The Skidmore standard that prevailed before 1984 required
judges to consider a wide—and non-exclusive—set of factors when
deciding whether to defer to agency interpretations of law, including the
consistency of the agency’s position, the agency’s level of expertise, and
the interpretation’s “power to persuade.”34 It would be hard to sketch a
looser standard, and, in practice, Skidmore deference was probably little
different from de novo review, with agencies cast as “little more than
expert witnesses.”35 Each case, and each agency interpretation of a
statute, would be evaluated by judges on its own merits. There were no
hard rules, only loose standards.
In contrast, Chevron demanded deference to agency interpretations
from judges, at least in the range of cases where congressional intent was

28. See id. at 591–92.
29. See id. at 592.
30. Id. at 593.
31. Id. at 590–93.
32. Id. at 595.
33. This could prompt change in either direction. If current law is rule-like and the
apparent threat is from actors that technically comply but violate the spirit of the law or
other important norms, then a move toward mud would allow decisionmakers to catch bad
behavior. On the other hand, if actors are perceived to be taking advantage of uncertain
standards to decide cases arbitrarily, or in line with their preferences, then a more
crystalline law could prevent that.
34. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
35. See Jellum, supra note 9, at 738.
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clear. Perhaps unintentionally,36 it does—or at least did—something
quite radical: after Chevron, judges were now required to accept some
agency interpretations they felt were wrong, or at least inferior.37 As
Justice Kavanaugh has put it, “when the Executive Branch chooses a
weak (but defensible) interpretation of a statute, and when the courts
defer, we have a situation where every relevant actor may agree that the
agency’s legal interpretation is not the best, yet that interpretation
carries the force of law. Amazing.”38
Chevron did not go as far as it might have. A fully crystalline solution
to the question of interpretive authority would be to simply say that
agencies always win. But of course, that would make courts impotent in
many administrative law cases, violating both Marbury39 and Article
III.40
Instead, Chevron takes a more constrained approach: judges first
decide if statutory ambiguity exists. If not, i.e., if “Congress has directly
spoken,” there is no deference.41 If ambiguity does exist, then judges are
directed to defer to the agency interpretation, at least within reason. 42
Skidmore’s multifactor inquiry is collapsed to a single question whose
outcome, in theory, determines the case. If there is no ambiguity, the
agency’s expertise, power to persuade, and the other factors are
irrelevant, and the agency loses.43 If there is ambiguity, those factors are
either similarly irrelevant, or nearly so, and the agency almost always

36. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 275–76 (2014) (noting that the parties, attorneys, and
Justices, including its author Justice Stevens, did not view Chevron as a landmark case or
doctrinal change when it was decided).
37. See Breyer, supra note 22, at 379.
38. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2151
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”).
41. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). As Chevron cases
illustrate, this inquiry is far more complex than it appears. See Jellum, supra note 9, at
727. Is the question whether the text or Congress’s intent is clear? Id. What tools can be
brought to bear to resolve any apparent ambiguity?
42. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 598–99 (2009). This “reasonableness” standard in Chevron’s “second step”
probably collapses into traditional arbitrary and capricious review. Id.
43. Id. at 599.
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wins.44 Such clarity and brevity are hallmark legal crystallization, even
if they do not go all the way.
To be sure, Chevron was never fully crystalline. It never dictated the
outcome of all cases. Its innovation—deference—only applies when a
court finds statutory ambiguity. Even when it does apply, it only shifts
decision-making authority to another body, the agency, rather than
dictating a substantive result. And even then, it only shifts that authority
within some range of reasonableness—though, again, Step Two is so
deferential at the Supreme Court level as to be nearly irrelevant.45
That said, Chevron never had a golden age of clarity; in
characterizing it as a crystallization I do not mean to imply that it did. It
took the Court years to figure out what it meant, 46 and by that time it
was already being constrained and reshaped, as the next section details.
It is plausible, therefore, to call Chevron a failed attempt at
crystallization. Linda Jellum does so, arguing that “the opinions of the
late 1980s and 1990s show a court divided and confused by Chevron. . . .
There is no consistency, just a muddy battlefield.”47 If this view is correct,
then Chevron did little: Skidmore deference was a muddy mess, Chevron
was too, and that remains the case today.
In my view, this goes too far, or was at least premature. Jellum’s
characterization is largely driven by a doctrinal fight within Chevron that
she observes and documents between textualist and “intentionalist”
views on what interpretive tools can be used to determine whether
statutory ambiguity exists.48 This dispute is important for understanding
Chevron deference, and I agree that the rise of textualism plays an
important role in Chevron’s decline over the long term.49 But the 1980s–
44. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 319
(8th ed. 2017) (“In practice, it is rare for a court to set aside an agency interpretation in step
two. By most counts, the Supreme Court has done so only twice.”); see also VERMEULE,
supra note 13, at 158 (“At [the Supreme Court] level, agencies almost never lose
[arbitrariness challenges],” within which Vermeule includes Chevron Step Two cases. Since
1982, he finds, “the Court has passed on the merits of arbitrariness challenges sixty-four
times. Of those, agencies have lost . . . only five times—a remarkable win rate of 92
percent.”).
45. See VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 158.
46. As noted above, Justice Stevens claims not to have intended a revolutionary
doctrinal change when he wrote the majority opinion in Chevron. See Merrill, supra note
36, at 275. Linda Jellum describes the process by which the Court came to grips with
Chevron’s import. See Jellum, supra note 9, at 743–53. Articles by Justices Scalia and
Breyer not long after Chevron was decided were particularly influential. See generally
Scalia, supra note 19; Breyer, supra note 22.
47. Jellum, supra note 9, at 760.
48. See id. at 753–60.
49. See infra discussion Section IV.E.2.
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90s disputes she discusses do not affect the basic crystallization that
Chevron achieved; and even if they did, it was temporary—as Jellum
describes, the textualists won.50 Jellum’s characterization of early
Chevron as “muddy” is also driven by the court’s 1994 decision in MCI
Telecommunications v. AT&T;51 for reasons detailed in the next section,
I agree that this case substantially undercut Chevron by narrowing its
scope.
The inconsistent application and internal conflict that mark the
Court’s early Chevron cases do not change the fact that it was a
significant step toward crystallization, relative to what preceded it.
Jellum does not appear to disagree; she notes that “[p]rior to Chevron,
not every agency opinion was entitled to deference. But Chevron
established an all-or-nothing default rule.”52 This is easier to see if one
steps back from the wider fight over textualism at the time, within which
Chevron cases were an inevitable battlefield. Justice Scalia was
nominated to the Court in 1986 and quickly became an ardent Chevron
supporter.53 He was soon followed by five other new Justices over the next
eight years, radically changing the makeup of the Court.54 For this new
Court, Chevron was the bedrock case in its domain, agency interpretation
of statutes.55 The law, or at least the Court, was ready for crystallization.
Over time, Chevron became “foundational, even . . . quasiconstitutional[,] . . . the undisputed starting point for any assessment of
the allocation of authority between federal courts and administrative
agencies.”56
It appears to have changed outcomes, too. Agencies won cases more
often under Chevron than under the preceding Skidmore regime, to a
small but still significant degree.57 Probably more importantly, agencies
50. Jellum, supra note 9, at 761.
51. Id. at 759–61.
52. Id. at 743.
53. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 521 (“I tend to think, however, that in the long run
Chevron will endure and be given its full scope—not so much because it represents a rule
that is easier to follow and thus easier to predict—though that is true enough—but because
it more accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately serves its
needs.”) (alteration in original); Jellum, supra note 9, at 748.
54. Jellum, supra note 9, at 753.
55. See id. at 748–60.
56. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 188.
57. See William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1099–1100 (2008) (finding a 76.2 percent win rate for agencies in Supreme Court
cases through 2006 under Chevron deference, versus a 73.5 percent win rate under
Skidmore and an overall win rate of 68.3 percent). See infra Section III.D (discussing this
and other empirical analyses of Chevron).
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could also now have real confidence judges would uphold their
interpretations, at least within some range. Review of agency decisions
became more predictable, allowing agencies to experiment more with
new regulatory approaches.58 With the confidence that litigation
outcomes are more predictable, agencies can better know—or, more
precisely, themselves better define—the limits of their authority.59 In
short, Chevron significantly empowered the executive branch at the
judiciary’s expense.60 As Justice Kavanaugh put it, while criticizing
Chevron:
In many ways, Chevron is nothing more than a judicially
orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the Executive
Branch. . . . From my more than five years of experience at the
White House, I can confidently say that Chevron encourages the
Executive Branch (whichever party controls it) to be extremely
aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting
statutory authorizations and restraints.61
It is of course possible to put the same argument in positive terms:
Chevron could free agencies from unreasonable judicial interference,
allowing them to use their superior subject-matter knowledge to better
fulfill congressional intent and address important problems.
For good or ill, within a few years, a core question in administrative
law—interpretive deference to agencies—had been crystallized, shifting
power seemingly permanently toward agencies and away from courts.
58. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 190 (“Chevron has signaled a substantial increase
in agency discretion to make policy through statutory interpretation. For this reason,
Chevron might well be seen not only as a kind of counter-Marbury, but even more
fundamentally as the administrative state’s very own McCulloch v. Maryland, permitting
agencies to do as they wish so long as there is a reasonable connection between their choices
and congressional instructions.”). This shadow effect of Chevron is, I suspect, far greater
than the marginal change in case outcomes, though it is probably impossible to measure.
59. In fact, assuming that the level of agency tolerance for risk is stable over time, a
perhaps naive view is that Chevron should not change the rate of agency victories/losses in
interpretive cases at all, at least in the long term. Instead, agencies should react by
increasing the aggressiveness of their interpretations until their post-Chevron success rate
is the same as the pre-Chevron rate. However, this assumes that the variation in results
before and after Chevron is the same. In fact, if Chevron did crystallize the law, giving more
consistent results, that variation should, almost by definition, decrease. Increased certainty
about outcomes should then allow agencies to be even more aggressive in their
interpretations, essentially reallocating some tolerated losses from bad luck to calculated
risks.
60. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 190; see also Jellum, supra note 9, at 728–29, 736–
37.
61. Kavanaugh, supra note 388, at 2150.
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III. CHEVRON TURNS TO MUD
Nearly as rapidly, however, Chevron’s crystal started to erode.
Within a few years after Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court began
to add exceptions to its reach, and additional exceptions have been added
over time. Students and practitioners must now master a complex list of
carve-outs, with litigants predictably arguing as much about whether a
case falls into one of the exceptions as they do about Chevron’s core
inquiry about statutory clarity.
Over the same period, the Supreme Court has by fits and starts
reduced the degree of deference shown in those cases that remain within
Chevron’s scope—Justices seem increasingly willing to find that a statute
is clear, i.e. that Congress has spoken to the issue, and that therefore
agency interpretations can be rejected at Chevron’s Step One. And on a
small number of recent occasions agencies have also lost cases at
Chevron’s Step 2; that is, Justices have determined that although
statutory ambiguity existed, the agency’s interpretive resolution of that
ambiguity was unreasonable, though as noted above, this has been
extremely rare under Chevron.
In short, Chevron has been eroded from the outside by reducing its
scope and from the inside by reducing the degree of deference courts give
in practice, even if the doctrine does not ostensibly change or narrow.
What was once a clear and simple doctrinal rule has become ever more
complex over time.62 Because much of Chevron’s value comes from its
crystalline clarity, this increase in complexity has seriously diminished
the doctrine’s significance.
While a comprehensive account of the evolution of Chevron in
practice is well beyond the scope of this Article, a review of the most
important shifts is perhaps necessary. Chevron itself contains no obvious
limiting principles—its two-step inquiry applies whenever “a court
reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.” 63
This is Chevron-as-crystal, or as close as it gets. Courts must defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of statutes. As Carol Rose’s theory
predicts, however, simple crystalline principles come under pressure
from real-world edge cases. For Chevron, this has happened fairly
quickly.

62. See Dan Farber, The Chevron Doctrine: Is It Fading? Could That Help Restrain
Trump?, LEGALPLANET (July 2, 2018), https://legal-planet.org/2018/07/02/straws-in-thewind-warning-signs-for-chevron/ (detailing complexity added to Chevron over time).
63. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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A. External Erosion
Initially, the erosion was external—classes of cases were taken out of
Chevron’s domain because of perceived tension between deference and
other values, problems of practical implementation, and other
limitations. For example, Chevron deference was deemed as early as 1990
not to apply to agency interpretations of criminal statutes;
interpretations of criminal statutes are reviewed de novo.64 Deference in
the criminal context would conflict with the rule of lenity and interfere
with courts’ longstanding central role in the administration of criminal
law.65 More broadly, the danger of concentration of power in criminal
adjudication is well understood—the proverbial “judge, jury, and
executioner.” Withholding deference in the criminal context is not widely
controversial; even strong defenders of deference to agencies rarely
suggest it should be extended to prosecutors,66 or that carving criminal
statutes out of Chevron’s domain is a serious threat to the wider rule. I
suspect that had someone asked Justice Stevens or the rest of the
majority in Chevron, immediately after it was handed down, whether
they meant it to apply to criminal statutes, they would have answered
“no, of course not.”
Other explicit constraints on Chevron’s domain or, as Peter Strauss
has called it, Chevron’s space,67 have followed. An incomplete list
includes interpretations articulated for the first time during litigation, 68
interpretations of statutes administered by multiple agencies, including

64. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
Justice Department, of course, has a very specific responsibility to determine for itself what
this statute means, in order to decide when to prosecute; but we have never thought that
the interpretation of those charged with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to
deference.”); see also United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014) (“[W]e have never held
that the Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”).
65. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014) (“[C]riminal laws are for
courts, not for the Government, to construe.”); see also Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity,
Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905, 916–17 (2007) (“[T]o a court thinking in lenity
terms, an ambiguous statute ultimately can only have one meaning: the more lenient one.”).
66. But see Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 469, 469 (1996) (arguing that the common-law-like delegation of interpretive
authority to courts in criminal law should instead be given to the Department of Justice).
67. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space”
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012).
68. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (“We have never
applied the principle of those cases to agency litigating positions that are wholly
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.”).
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the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) itself, 69 statutes for which
Congress has specifically provided for de novo review,70 and
interpretations regarding the scope of judicial review.71 Like the
exclusion of interpretations of criminal statutes, these exceptions can be
easily defended and seem relatively modest, though the frequency of
litigation and large number of cross-agency statutes means both
exceptions may be quite significant in practice.72 The Court’s refusal to
defer to interpretations of multi-agency statutes is an outgrowth of
Chevron itself, which actually does contain a limitation on its own scope:
it applies only to an agency’s interpretations of statutes “which it
administers.”73 Multi-agency statutes, by definition, are not
administered by any single agency, and therefore cannot fall within
Chevron’s domain. The practical problems that would come from
deference in this context are fairly obvious. Would the Court have to
uphold inconsistent or even contrary interpretations of a statute by two
or more agencies? Each of these exclusions seems sensible, perhaps even
obvious.74 But nevertheless, they shrink Chevron’s domain, eroding the
scope of its crystalline clarity. Mud creeps in.

69. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (denying
deference to an Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs interpretation of the APA on
the grounds that it “is not a statute that the [agency] is charged with administering”).
70. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (requiring de novo review of Freedom of Information Act
claims); see also John C. Brinkerhoff Jr. & Daniel B. Listwa, Deference Conservation—
FOIA’s Lessons for a Chevron-less World, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 146, 147 (2018), https://
www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/deference-conservation-foias-lessons-for-a-chevron-lessworld/.
71. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) (“[A] role for the
Department of Labor in administering the statute . . . does not empower the Secretary to
regulate the scope of the judicial power vested by the statute.”) (citation omitted).
72. See, e.g., discussion infra Section IV.A.3 (treating at length King v. Burwell, 576
U.S. 473 (2015), in which the multi-agency aspect of a recently enacted statute became
particularly relevant). See also Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump
Administration Is Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 12:05 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-presidenttrump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5bb51b7ff322e9_story.html (describing the historical frequency of APA litigation).
73. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
74. Some other categorical exclusions are harder to explain. For example, until 2011, it
was unclear whether Chevron applied in tax cases. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch.
v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53–57 (2011) (holding that Chevron, rather than the
multifactor National Muffler standard, applied in tax cases). Mayo is a rare counterexample
to the pattern of narrowing of Chevron’s scope discussed in this section, though it may just
be the Court resolving unclear precedent rather than a meaningful expansion of the
doctrine.
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This process of external erosion of Chevron reached its peak in 2000–
01, with the Court’s decisions in Christensen v. Harris County 75 and, in
particular, United States v. Mead Corp.76 In Mead, the Court refused to
defer to a Customs Service classification of imported day planners, one of
10,000 to 15,000 such interpretations each year.77 Despite the fact that
such classifications are, in fact, statutory interpretations of the tariff
schedule, the Court ruled that such ministerial interpretations, lacking
“the force of law,” are not entitled to deference.78 While it is difficult to
parse what the majority meant by reference to “force of law”—after all,
the Customs Service determination did subject the importer to higher
tariffs—the opinion does place significant emphasis on the fact that tariff
categorization is a quick, nearly process-free interpretive decision by the
agency.79 Christensen similarly rejected deference for agency
interpretations in an opinion letter.80 The Mead majority suggests that
Chevron’s domain is really for agency interpretations that come out of
meaningful deliberative processes, like formal adjudication and noticeand-comment rulemaking, though the Court does not go so far as to say
that only interpretations in these proceedings will get deference.81
Mead’s constriction of Chevron’s scope can be readily defended—
agencies making small-bore ministerial decisions, even when they are
nominally interpretations of statutes, are not engaging in the kind of
deep technical analysis that gives them an expertise advantage over
courts, and as the court finds in Mead, Congress arguably did not intend
to delegate broad interpretive powers when it granted agencies the
authority to make small decisions.82 On the other hand, it is not obvious
75. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
76. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
77. Id. at 233.
78. Id. at 221.
79. Id. at 231–33 (“[The Customs Service’s rulings] present a case far removed not only
from the notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably
suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference
claimed for them here.”).
80. 529 U.S. at 587.
81. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed.”). But see id. at 231 (“The fact that the tariff classification here was
not a product of such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of
Chevron.”).
82. See id. at 231–33 (“The authorization for classification rulings, and Customs’s
practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from notice-and-comment
process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever
thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here.”).
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why making large numbers of small decisions requires less expertise
than big, considered, and contentious rulemakings. And the effects of
such decisions may be large, as the number of customs classifications
indicates—the delegation of power is a big one. Turning crystal to mud
in Mead is defensible, but not as obviously so as in earlier constraints on
Chevron.
Moreover, the Court in Mead explicitly opted for mud over crystal,
reviving the moribund Skidmore deference regime, rather than opting for
de novo review as in the criminal context.83 As discussed above, Skidmore
grants an amorphous and highly context-sensitive degree of deference to
agency interpretations. It is as muddy as standards get.
Justice Scalia objected to the Mead majority’s contraction of
Chevron’s domain and in particular to the revival of Skidmore deference
in a trademark fiery dissent.84 For Justice Scalia, Mead is “an avulsive
change in judicial review of federal administrative action” that has
“replaced the Chevron doctrine” and “we will be sorting out the
consequences . . . for years to come.”85 Resurrecting Skidmore “has
largely replaced Chevron . . . with that test most beloved by a court
unwilling to be held to rules—and most feared by litigants who want to
know what to expect—: th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”86 In
other words, Justice Scalia accused the Court of replacing Chevron
crystal with anachronistic Skidmore mud.87 As he points out, this is
doubly true: Mead introduces ambiguity both about Chevron’s scope and
about the degree of deference available when a case falls outside that
scope.88 In his view, this is pernicious. Perhaps, Justice Scalia argues,
It was possible to live with the indeterminacy of Skidmore
deference in earlier times[, b]ut in an era when federal statutory
law administered by federal agencies is pervasive, and when the
ambiguities . . . that those statutes contain are innumerable,
totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for
uncertainty, unpredictably, and endless litigation.89

83. See id. at 234 (“To agree with the Court of Appeals that Customs ruling letters do
not fall within Chevron is not, however, to place them outside the pale of any deference
whatever. Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form . . . .”).
84. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 241 (alteration in original).
87. Id. at 250.
88. See id. at 239.
89. Id. at 250.
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Justice Scalia closes with a prediction that Mead’s “consequences will
be enormous, and almost uniformly bad.”90 Nor was Justice Scalia alone
in his criticism: scholars and other commentators have called Mead and
the Court’s attempts to apply it “incoherent” or a “mess.” 91
Justice Scalia’s predictions in his Mead dissent in retrospect seem
somewhat overblown. He was undoubtedly correct that Mead made the
deference inquiry more complex for courts and litigants, adding what
Cass Sunstein has called “Step Zero” to that inquiry.92 Step Zero is a land
mine students and brief writers now have to navigate, to their great
frustration. Nevertheless, agencies can easily avoid Mead and retain
access to Chevron deference by using APA procedures—notice-andcomment or formal adjudication. Though Mead revealed the Skidmore
abyss, it can still be bridged. Even if an agency does not use such
procedures or lacks the authority to do so, it may still get deference, as
the Court first suggested in Mead itself and has reiterated since.93 If
anything, Mead clarified the issue somewhat by making the level of
procedure an important marker, if not a decisive one.
Mead has also lacked the reach in practice that Justice Scalia and
other critics predicted it would have. That is due in part, however, to
disagreement within the Court about the interaction between Chevron,
Mead, and Skidmore.94 It is also due to further decisions that have been
interpreted to substantially limit Mead’s reach—most notably Barnhart
v. Walton, decided soon after Mead.95 In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the
Court in Barnhart suggested that even statutory interpretations in
informal guidance documents could be entitled to Chevron deference,
depending on “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration
of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of
90. Id. at 261.
91. Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 528 &
n.14 (2014) (quoting Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 347, 347 (2003)); id. at 528 & n.15 (“examining court of appeals decisions applying
Mead and concluding that Justice Scalia ‘actually understated the effect of Mead’”) (quoting
Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2005)).
92. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 191.
93. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (majority opinion); see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
221 (2002) (“[T]he fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through means
less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking does not automatically deprive that
interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due.”) (citation omitted).
94. Hickman, supra note 91, at 530.
95. See 535 U.S. at 222.
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time.”96 But these factors sound much more like Skidmore’s multifactor
test than Chevron’s ostensibly bright-line rule regarding access to
deference.
The edges of Chevron’s scope are therefore muddy, but Mead did not
make them so alone—courts had struggled for years with whether smallbore agency determinations of various types were entitled to deference. 97
It often remains unclear when Mead—and therefore Chevron, Skidmore,
or something in between—applies. If Mead is less important than Justice
Scalia predicted and feared, that is partly because it is even less clear
when it applies than he thought. Moreover, it can be applied
opportunistically, taking agency interpretations in or out of Chevron’s
domain as needed.98
Mead is the culmination of more than fifteen years of Supreme Court
decisions restricting Chevron’s scope, eroding its power from the outside.
In each case, Chevron’s broad, albeit never bright-line, deference rule
yielded to some practical consideration. Deference to interpretations in
criminal cases, of multi-agency statutes, in mere agency litigating
positions, and in small-potatoes guidance documents would interfere
with other important values like the rule of lenity, be unworkable in
practice, or perhaps give too much unfettered power to agencies. Or to
look at it from the other side, none of these areas, one gets the sense the
Court is saying, is really what Chevron was about, for good or at least
defensible reasons. So is crystal ground to mud.
B. Internal Erosion
A second, albeit to some extent overlapping, phase of Chevron’s
erosion undercut the deference doctrine from the inside. The Court has
repeatedly purported to apply Chevron while denying meaningful
deference. The roots of this internal erosion may go back to Chevron’s
earliest days,99 but most clearly emerged in a series of cases in the early
2000s. The doctrinal meaning of each of these cases is of course
contestable, but taken together they have substantially reduced the scope
of Chevron in practice. Initially, this occurred by narrowing Step One—
96. Id.
97. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
850–51 & nn.88–92 (2001).
98. See, e.g., Amy J. Wildermuth, What Twombly and Mead Have in Common, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 276, 277–78 (2008) (claiming Mead is susceptible to “results-oriented
manipulation”).
99. See Jellum, supra note 9, at 748–60 (documenting evolving understandings of Step
One in the 1980s and 1990s).

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

460

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

WINTER 2021

[Vol. 73:2

that is, through increasing willingness to find that Congress had “clearly
spoken” in a statute, thus leaving no ambiguity for an agency to
interpret. More recently, at least one case suggests deference has
narrowed at Step Two as well.
This sub rosa erosion of Chevron is more corrosive than external,
explicit narrowing of scope because it not only reduces the doctrine’s
power to decide cases, but also creates ambiguity and sows doubt. At the
risk of pushing the crystals and mud metaphor too far, external erosion
grinds down crystalline rules, while internal erosion softens or dissolves
them whole.
To be sure, the losing party, dissenting judges, and outside observers
who disagree with the outcome of a case will often accuse the majority of
incorrectly applying relevant doctrine or applying it in form but not in
good faith. In Chevron cases, this typically comes as an accusation that
the majority has found ambiguity—and therefore, under Chevron,
deferred to the agency interpretation—where a harder look, applying the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, would have uncovered a
clear meaning.100 Or, conversely, that the majority too readily found a
clear meaning when deeper inquiry would have revealed ambiguity. 101
The presence of such dissents and critiques is not, alone, enough to prove
that Chevron is ungrounded, indeterminate, or even eroding.
Disagreement over how a rule or doctrine should be applied is possible
no matter how crystalline the doctrine—though one of the advantages of
crystalline rules are that such disagreements are, in theory, rarer.
Nevertheless, each push on the boundaries of a doctrine creates
precedent for further such moves, and repeated or egregious violence
done to those boundaries can render them meaningless. In my view, the
Court has done such violence to the boundaries of Chevron’s Step One in
at least one such case, probably two, and possibly more.
The clearest case of internal erosion is FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., decided by the Court in 2000, a year before Mead.102 The
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) had issued rulemakings
regulating tobacco products, asserting jurisdiction based on its
interpretation of its own primary governing statute, the Food, Drug, and

100. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
714–15 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority failed to discern a clear
textual meaning of “harm” in the Endangered Species Act).
101. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 558 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[I]n the face of textual ambiguity, the Court’s application of Chevron deference . . . is
nowhere to be found.”).
102. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).103 The FDCA gave the FDA authority to regulate
“drugs” and “devices . . . intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body.”104 In the FDA’s view, nicotine was a “drug” and cigarettes
were “devices” within the FDCA’s definitions due to their wellestablished effects on the body’s structure and function.105 Tobacco firms
sued the agency, claiming that it lacked authority to regulate their
products.106
The case comes down to a relatively simple question of statutory
interpretation—are tobacco products drugs or devices within the FDCA’s
definitions? If so, the FDA has authority to, in fact must, regulate
them.107 If not, the agency does not have that authority. This is a clearcut question of statutory interpretation that does not fall into one of the
exclusions from Chevron’s domain. Deference should therefore apply:
unless Congress has clearly spoken—Step One—or the agency’s
interpretation is unreasonable—Step Two—the agency interpretation
prevails.108
Statutory interpretation is often hard. But this looks like it should be
an easy case. No one seriously contests that nicotine and tobacco products
affect the structure and function of the body and are intended to do so.
That is the point of smoking. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the FDA’s
interpretation in a five-to-four holding.109 Not only did the court reject
the FDA’s assertion that its interpretation reflected the plain meaning of
the statute, but the Court in fact reached the opposite conclusion:
Congress’s clear intent in the FDCA, it ruled, was to deny the FDA
regulatory authority over tobacco.110 So much for deference. Indeed, at
first blush the outcome seems like anti-deference; where the statute is,
or at least seems, clearly in favor of the agency’s position, as it does in
Brown & Williamson, no deference is necessary. Chevron did not change
that. But like I said, statutory interpretation is hard. Maybe you do not
think the FDCA is as clear as I do. But even if so, the agency should still
prevail because, under Chevron, the Court should defer in such
ambiguous cases.
The Court, of course, did not overrule Chevron in Brown &
Williamson. So, what is going on? One possibility is simply motivated
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 135.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 160–61.
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reasoning by the Justices in the majority: uncomfortable with a major
expansion in federal regulatory power, they were unwilling or unable to
do what Chevron commands—to defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes with which they personally
disagree.111 Of course, even if the Justices’ policy preferences were the
driving force behind the result in Brown & Williamson, the majority
cannot just say that in the opinion—legal reasons to reach the result have
to be given. And if one is inclined to interpret the majority opinion more
charitably, those reasons might be convincing. In either case they set
precedent, shaping how statutory interpretation cases under Chevron are
decided afterwards.
The stated reasoning for the result in Brown & Williamson is that
extrinsic evidence, beyond the statute itself, shows that Congress did not
intend to grant the FDA authority to regulate tobacco—or, more
precisely, interpretive authority to determine whether it had that
substantive authority.112 Chevron instructs courts to divine congressional
intent via the “traditional tools of statutory construction”: 113 text, but also
context, canons of interpretation, and the like.114 The majority in Brown
& Williamson expands the list of tools to include evidence of intent from
other, later statutes.115 Under the FDCA, products regulated by the FDA
must be “safe,” but the Court concluded that “safe” tobacco was an
oxymoron and that the FDA would be forced eventually to ban
cigarettes.116 This, the Court found, was inconsistent with other statutes
related to tobacco passed by Congress after the FDCA, such as laws
requiring warning labels or banning some tobacco advertising.117 These
later statutes, under this interpretation, worked an implicit partial
repeal of the FDCA,118 despite the fact that such implicit repeal is usually
disfavored.119 The Court also pointed to the “economic and political
significance” of the agency’s regulatory action as a reason to conclude
Congress did not intend to grant regulatory or interpretive authority, a
point the Court would later clarify as an independent exception to
111. See Breyer, supra note 22, at 379 (“[N]either a strict view of Chevron, nor any other
strictly defined verbal review formula requiring deference to an agency’s interpretation of
law can prove successful in the long run . . . [because] such a formula asks judges to develop
a cast of mind that often is psychologically difficult to maintain.”).
112. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160–61.
113. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
114. See id. at 863–64.
115. Brown & Williams, 529 U.S. at 143.
116. Id. at 130.
117. Id. at 137.
118. See id. at 181 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003).
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Chevron,120 and to the inconsistency of the FDA’s claim of authority with
its past practice of refusing to regulate tobacco.121
The FDA, according to the majority, had misread the FDCA in its
broader context—the ostensibly clear definitions of “drug” and “device”
in the statute had to be read in light of other congressional action. 122
Moreover, in the majority’s reasoning, the tension between textual and
extra-textual—indeed, statutory and extra-statutory—evidence did not
just create ambiguity which, under Chevron, the agency would have had
the opportunity to fill.123 Instead, it fully overcame the text of the statute,
making the intent of Congress to deny FDA authority over tobacco
unambiguous.124
In simplest Chevron terms, the agency thought it did not need
deference at all, but the Court said the agency lost at Step One. It is
impossible to know without probing the minds of the Justices in the
majority which of these readings of Brown & Williamson is correct:
motivated reasoning or broadening of Step One to include implied repeal.
I suspect some of both. But for our purposes here it is not necessary to
choose—both have corrosive effects on Chevron’s predictability and
power.
As noted above, Step One is the key to whether Chevron is crystal or
mud. If Chevron had instructed courts to always and everywhere defer to
agency interpretation, subsequent cases would be easy to understand
and to predict. But, as noted, that would be incompatible with Marbury
and probably unconstitutional. The opposite rule—de novo review of
agency interpretations—would also be crystalline with respect to the
deference rule, affording none, but not with respect to case outcomes: the
reviewing court might agree or disagree with the agency’s statutory
interpretation. Chevron’s Step One principle—that judges defer when
statutes are ambiguous125—is a compromise approach. The initial metainquiry about ambiguity is de novo, entirely within the hands of judges.
But once complete, the pendulum swings toward substantial deference.
An escape hatch remains in Step Two: judges may reject “unreasonable”
or “impermissible” agency interpretations, but until recently judges have
rarely if ever done so.126 Therefore if Step One is broad, if lots of statutes
are ambiguous, Chevron deference has great power. And if the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See discussion infra Section III.C.
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 147.
Id. at 132–33.
Id. at 132, 159–61.
See id. at 160–61.
See Scalia, supra note 19, at 511.
See BREYER ET AL., supra note 44, at 319.
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boundaries of Step One are reasonably clear, such that courts take a
consistent approach to determining whether there is ambiguity, Chevron
deference is predictable.
The Court’s approach to Step One in Brown & Williamson undercut
both of these values. If one reads Brown & Williamson as entirely resultsoriented, the damage to Chevron is relatively clear. If judges have broad
or unlimited freedom to decide what statutory provisions are ambiguous
and which are not, according to their policy preferences and unmoored to
any principle, then the deference available at Step Two should they find
ambiguity is, if not meaningless, at least secondary. Substantial power
would be reallocated from agencies to judges. Step One discretion would
swallow Chevron.
But even if one does not read Brown & Williamson as an exercise of
naked results-oriented judging, its expansion of the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation has similar effects. The broader the list of factors
and sources of evidence that judges may marshal to determine whether
ambiguity exists, the greater their discretion and the less deferential
Chevron becomes. Statutory text, context, purpose, interpretive canons,
and for some Justices legislative history were already acknowledged as
sources for divining the clarity of congressional intent. 127 Debate among
Justices over which factors should be considered, and which should
determine the outcome in any case, was of course common. 128 But to the
then-existing list of factors Brown & Williamson added implied repeal by
subsequent statutes, the “economic and political” significance of the
regulatory action and the degree to which an agency interpretation
breaks with past practice.129 In doing so, Brown & Williamson expanded
the Step One inquiry from one grounded at least largely in the statute
toward a wide-ranging multifactor analysis, one that sounds much more
like Skidmore mud than Chevron crystal. There is no way to reasonably
predict which factors a reviewing Court will choose to consider, to
emphasize, and to minimize. Opportunities for results-oriented judging
increase—there is little difference between a test with many factors and
a test with none at all. Brown & Williamson alone may not have made
Chevron Step One completely indeterminate at the Court, but no other
case took a bigger step in that direction.
Moreover, the Court in Brown & Williamson announced no change in
Chevron’s scope, unlike with the external erosions discussed above.
127. See Jellum, supra note 9, at 728.
128. See, e.g., Jellum, supra note 9, 727–30 (describing textualist-intentionalist divide
within Chevron Step One).
129. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 147.
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Brown & Williamson was ostensibly a pure Step One case, decided within
the four corners of Chevron. This has potentially greater effect on
Chevron as a doctrine because the precedents it sets—the additions it
makes to the Step One toolbox—are not limited to any discernible class
of cases. Implied repeal, economic and political significance, and change
in longstanding agency interpretation are, after Brown & Williamson,
factors that every court may, possibly must, consider in deference cases.
Justice Scalia, who would be a year later so scathing in his critique
of Mead’s muddying of Chevron, was in the Brown & Williamson majority
and appears to have had little or no objection to the Court’s approach. 130
This should perhaps not be surprising, as Justice Scalia always took a
broad view of the Court’s toolkit for determining whether statutory
language is ambiguous.131 In an oft-quoted defense of Chevron in 1989,
he argued that:
[T]he “traditional tools of statutory construction” include not
merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the
consideration of policy consequences. . . . Policy evaluation is, in
other words, part of the traditional judicial tool-kit that is used
in applying the first step of Chevron—the step that determines,
before deferring to agency judgment, whether the law is indeed
ambiguous. Only when the court concludes that the policy
furthered by neither textually possible interpretation will be
clearly “better”—in the sense of achieving what Congress
apparently wished to achieve—will it, pursuant to Chevron, yield
to the agency’s choice. But the reason it yields is assuredly not
that [the court] has no constitutional competence to consider and
evaluate policy.132
If judges’ policy preferences are a fair basis for deciding whether a
statute is ambiguous, the factors added by Brown & Williamson are small
potatoes. Perhaps Justice Scalia does not really believe judicial policy
preferences should control Step One outcomes; later in the same Article
he praises Chevron’s predictability:
Chevron is unquestionably better than what preceded it.
Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the

130.
131.
132.

Id. at 124.
See Scalia, supra note 19, at 515.
Id. (alteration in original).
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bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a
particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be
known.133
Reconciling these two views is difficult, however. If judges’ policy
views are relevant at Step One, it is unclear how Congress can rely on
agency policy preferences to control outcomes under Chevron. “[W]ithin
the bounds of permissible interpretation” in the second quotation is doing
a lot of work. This indeterminacy casts Justice Scalia’s Mead dissent in
a new light. His version of Chevron is not and never was the bright-line
rule he claims is threatened by Mead’s revival of Skidmore. Justice
Scalia’s Chevron, if that is what was applied in Brown & Williamson,
shifts much less power from judges to agencies and has much less
predictable outcomes than the standard account of Chevron or his own
claims suggest. The broad view of Step One Justice Scalia articulates in
his 1989 essay seems inconsistent with the Brown & Williamson Court’s
approach insofar as Justice Scalia and the rest of the majority there
include the agency’s reversal of a longstanding position in the factors
they consider relevant. Justice Scalia pointed to Chevron’s abandonment
of Skidmore’s inclusion of agency stability of position as one of the later
case’s chief virtues, preventing judicial ossification of regulatory law. 134
Perhaps it is unfair to single out Justice Scalia. The four other
Justices in the Brown & Williamson majority were equally willing to
expand the scope of Step One. Although the four dissenting Justices
argued forcefully that the Court should have deferred to the FDA’s
interpretation, they did not call for a narrower approach to Step One,
other than by rejecting the majority’s reading of later congressional
enactments.135 And many of the same Justices dissenting in Brown &
Williamson have been accused of motivated reasoning at Chevron Step
One in other cases.136 My claim here is not to suggest that Justice Scalia
is unique in holding a broad view of Step One that sharply limits
Chevron’s power and predictability; I suspect that when the chips are
down it is quite difficult for any judge to do what Chevron asks and set
aside their preferences in favor of the agency’s. Justice Scalia’s honest
inclusion of judicial policy preferences within the Step One toolkit is
133. Id. at 517.
134. Id.
135. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 181–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
715 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority failed to discern a clear textual
meaning of “harm” in the Endangered Species Act based on a misreading of the statute’s
purpose).
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therefore worthy of some praise, even if it undercuts the virtues he
attributes to Chevron in the same Article. It is harder to square these
views and his vote in Brown & Williamson with the rule-like Chevron he
describes in his Mead dissent, however.
Brown & Williamson was not unique in its broad view of the Court’s
Step One tools, nor was its influence limited to the Justices who signed
onto its majority opinion—a broad Step One would not be a factional
project. In Massachusetts v. EPA, decided a few years later, all four
Justices who would have deferred to the FDA’s statutory interpretation
of the FDCA refused to defer to the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air
Act that greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change were not “air
pollutants” subject to regulation under the law. 137 Only Justice Kennedy
was in the majority in both cases.138 The cases differ in many important
respects.
Massachusetts, like Brown & Williamson, is marked by an aggressive
approach to Step One and a resulting refusal to defer to the agency’s
view. Brown & Williamson paid little heed to statutory text, appealing to
extra-textual factors, some of them found in Step One toolbox for the first
time. In contrast, the Massachusetts court focused almost solely on one
textual provision of the statute, the definition of “air pollutant.” 139 This
required rejecting all of the agency’s claims for a broader reading,
including evidence from later congressional enactments that, in the
agency’s view, indicated Congress did not intend to delegate authority to
regulate greenhouse gases.140 This forced the majority to distinguish
Brown & Williamson, doing so with a vague pronouncement that
regulatory authority over tobacco “clashed with . . . ‘common sense’
intuition,” while lack of authority over greenhouse gases did not.141
Justice Scalia in dissent argued that the majority even got its textual
analysis wrong, ignoring part of the relevant definition and missing
ambiguity that should have gotten the agency to Step Two. 142 Cass
Sunstein, no critic of the administrative state in general or of climate
regulation, has criticized the Massachusetts court for too quickly

137. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007); Brown & Williamson, 529
U.S. at 163–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 503; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 124.
139. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528–29.
140. Id. at 529–30.
141. Id. at 531.
142. Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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resolving the Step One ambiguity inquiry and therefore showing
insufficient deference to the agency’s interpretation.143
The Court’s approaches to Chevron Step One in Brown & Williamson
and Massachusetts are therefore superficially quite different—
Massachusetts is all about text; Brown & Williamson is all about, well,
everything else. Such contrast probably should not be surprising, given
that the Justices in dissent and majority are almost exactly reversed. 144
But a closer look is revealing—the Justices’ methodological approaches
in the two cases are against type. Noted textualist Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Thomas, spends a great deal of time in both cases appealing
to context, purpose, and broad legislative intent. At the same time, the
more liberal Justices are quite willing to pound the text. This gives away
the game. It is difficult to read the results in the two cases as determined
by anything other than the policy preferences of a majority of the court,
with mere lip service given to the statutory ambiguity inquiry in
Chevron. Even if one is not willing to go that far, the extreme range of
judicial flexibility in Chevron Step One still makes access to the deference
in Step Two extremely unpredictable, and therefore substantially
reduces Chevron’s power and influence. In short, Brown & Williamson
shows that judges can dig through the Step One toolbox until they find
the evidence they need, while Massachusetts shows judges can grab one
tool and more or less ignore the others. If that reading is correct, almost
anything is possible at Step One.
It is possible that expansion of the boundaries of Step One, eroding
Chevron from the inside, was inevitable. Just as it is difficult in
individual cases for judges to follow Chevron’s deference command, it is
difficult for courts to hold the line on a principled doctrine in the face of
edge cases and other pressures; this is Carol Rose’s insight.145 Crystal
looks eternal but cannot hold for long, much less forever. Michael Herz
describes Chevron as a “self-regulatory regime[]” that relies “on entities
143. Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate Change, 2009–2016, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
231, 242–43 (2018).
144. Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing
Shadow, 3 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 143 (2007). Seven of the Justices on the Court when Brown
& Williamson was decided remained on the Court in 2007 when Massachusetts was decided,
and the two changes in personnel did not affect the Court’s ideological balance. See id. at
128. Justice Kennedy voted in the majority in both cases. Id. at 143. Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented in Brown & Williamson but were in the majority
in Massachusetts. Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas were in the majority in Brown &
Williamson but dissented in Massachusetts. Id. Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist were also
in the majority in Brown & Williamson, but were replaced by Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts, who dissented in Massachusetts. Id.
145. See supra Section II.
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[here, judges] to oversee themselves.”146 Such regimes are extremely hard
to maintain. As he puts it in the Chevron context, “[o]nly in the rarest of
self-protective settings will courts create and stand by a super-strong
hands-off principle. Chevron has never, in practice, amounted to an
abdication of the judicial role, if only because judges are not going
voluntarily to disarm.”147
A narrow view on the traditional tools available at Step One no doubt
makes Chevron cases more predictable, but as the deep disagreement
over textual meaning in Massachusetts illustrates, not by much. Even a
small toolkit gives judges broad freedom. For example, the Court applies
traditional canons of statutory construction, part of the traditional tools
at Step One, denying deference if they allow plain meaning to be
discerned.148 As Karl Llewellyn famously argued, these canons are in
reality indeterminate; they do not compel a consistent reading of
statutes.149 Judges may pick and choose among them to reach a preferred
result. This complexity, unpredictability, and, well, muddiness gets
worse as more interpretive tools are added to the Step One inquiry, as
the Court did in Brown & Williamson, shifting power back to judges.
Even if one reads Brown & Williamson as consistent with past Chevron
Step One practice, all that proves is that the inquiry was always
extremely broad—judges were never really, in Herz’s terms, selfregulating at all.150
Not all scholars read the evolution of Step One and, by extension,
Chevron’s power and influence the same way. Linda Jellum argues that
rather than expanding in scope, Step One has narrowed; where once it
looked to intent as well as text, the Court over time has come to focus
almost exclusively on “a search for mere textual clarity.”151 In Jellum’s
view, this narrowing explains the Court’s reduced reliance on Chevron,

146. Herz, supra note 8, at 1873.
147. Id. at 1871; see also Breyer, supra note 22, at 379 (noting psychological difficulty of
meaningful and persistent deference doctrines).
148. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (“[T]he Chevron
Court explained that deference is not due unless a ‘court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction,’ is left with an unresolved ambiguity. . . . Where, as here, the canons
supply an answer, ‘Chevron leaves the stage.’”) (citations omitted). But see Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE
L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (noting tension between use of “normative” canons of construction and
Chevron’s allocation of interpretive authority to agencies, leading to circuit splits on how
canons should be applied in Chevron cases).
149. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
150. See Herz, supra note 8, at 1873.
151. See Jellum, supra note 9, at 761, 770.
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effectively narrowing its scope.152 Thus, Chevron has entered
“[s]enescence” because “[t]extualism [r]eigns.”153 As described above, I do
not agree that the Court has narrowed Step One over time; quite the
opposite. But Professor Jellum and I are otherwise not far apart. We
agree that the Court often “p[ays] lip service” to Step One ambiguity
analysis in Chevron cases.154 For Jellum, this is evidence that Step One
has become less relevant, with the Court “almost impatient” to get to
deeper review at Step Two.155 Instead, I think that Step One has been
expanded so much that Step Two is only very rarely relevant.
Under this view, Brown & Williamson is unusual not because of its
expansive view of the tools available for determining ambiguity at Step
One, but its willingness to discuss that range openly. In other cases, the
Court similarly reaches its preferred result in Step One but feels no need
to discuss how in any depth. Perhaps the Brown & Williamson Court was
forced to show the full arsenal of Step One only because the statutory
language was so clearly in the agency’s favor. Brown & Williamson is
emphatically not a textualist holding. In any case, Professor Jellum and
I certainly agree that Chevron has declined in significance, though
perhaps for somewhat different reasons.
C. The Internal/External Distinction Blurs
Chevron’s decline has been continuous and, perhaps, inexorable. But
for a time, the Court was at least willing to make explicit its constraints
on deference. By the late 1990s, however, implicit, internal erosion of
Chevron became the norm.156 In my view, Brown & Williamson was the
pivotal case in this trend, pulling back the curtain enough to reveal
Chevron’s empty core.
The best evidence that Brown & Williamson was a major departure
from previous Chevron practice is that the Court has since excised the
case from the main line of Chevron jurisprudence by creating a new,
explicit limitation on Chevron’s scope—the so-called major questions
doctrine.157 Under the doctrine, certain “extraordinary cases” involving
interpretive questions that have major political, economic, or social

152. Id. at 761.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent
“Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 358 (2016).
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implications are taken out of the Chevron framework.158 In other words,
the major questions doctrine is, along with Mead, part of “Step Zero” of
the Chevron process.159 The reference to “extraordinary cases” comes
from language in Brown & Williamson, and in later cases.160 Brown &
Williamson and another case decided a year before, MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, have been treated as the first major
questions doctrine cases.161 Brown & Williamson did not announce any
doctrinal change, however, and in fact explicitly cited the basis for its
holding within Step One.162 Neither did MCI purport to change Chevron
doctrine; the basis for the holding there is somewhat cryptic, but it can
be read as either a Brown & Williamson-style expansive Step One case
or a rare agency loss at Step Two.163 Despite these dubious roots, the
major questions doctrine has since reappeared from time to time in
subsequent Court decisions and dissents164 before being explicitly
enshrined in Chevron doctrine in 2015’s King v. Burwell.165
The major questions doctrine has been heavily criticized as an
erosion of Chevron and a judicial power-grab.166 As I have argued in a
previous Article, there is an alternative interpretation—the major
questions doctrine at least cabins the erosion of Chevron in Brown &
Williamson, MCI, and their progeny to a narrow class of “major” cases.167
Without it, judges unwilling to follow Chevron’s self-restraint
requirements in such cases are forced to wedge their arguments into the
preexisting Chevron framework, typically, as in Brown & Williamson, by
finding that the statute unambiguously dictates the reading they
prefer.168 Doing so muddies Step One doctrine, creating precedent for
further mischief.169 A formal major questions doctrine confines that

158. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). See generally Richardson, supra note
157.
159. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 213, 236.
160. Richardson, supra note 157, at 371–72.
161. Id. at 364–66, 371 (discussing the foundational role of MCI and Brown &
Williamson in the major question doctrine).
162. See discussion supra Section III.B.
163. Id. at 364–65.
164. Id. at 360–78.
165. 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015). See discussion infra Section IV.A.3.
166. See Richardson, supra note 158, at 390–409 (discussing critiques of the major
questions doctrine at length).
167. See generally id.
168. Id. at 412, 422.
169. Id. at 422.
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mischief to a small sandbox of cases, possibly restricted to the Supreme
Court.170
Of course, that only works if the class of major cases is relatively
small, and if its boundaries can be at least roughly determined in
advance.171 So far, the list of Supreme Court cases explicitly citing the
doctrine is small, though there does seem to be a recent increase.172 But,
just as with Mead’s “force of law” requirement, the boundaries of the
major questions doctrine have never been clear. What makes a case
major? It appears to be some combination of economic significance,
political controversy, and a significant shift in the agency’s asserted
regulatory authority, though the cases never list factors explicitly.173 It
is therefore hard to say how effective the major questions doctrine has
been in constraining erosion of Chevron, much less in predicting how
effective it will be in the future.
The Court has also linked the major questions doctrine to a parallel
quasi-clear statement rule for significant grants of regulatory authority
to agencies. As Justice Scalia has repeatedly articulated the principle,
Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes”—in other words,
courts will be unwilling to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of
agencies if doing so would substantially increase their authority.174 It is
unclear where in the Chevron framework this principle does its work.
Some of the cases suggest it is an additional factor in the major questions
doctrine analysis—where statutory support is in some sense thin, and
the implications large, Chevron will not apply at all.175 Or the principle
may operate within Step One, setting a higher bar for ambiguity where
the agency’s resolution of the claimed ambiguity would substantially
increase its authority.176 Either interpretation reduces Chevron’s power
and predictability, however. “Elephants in mouseholes” is a simple
principle in application—it increases the degree of statutory ambiguity
required for agencies to access Chevron deference.

170. See id. at 360, 428–29.
171. See id. at 426–27.
172. See id. at 376–79.
173. Id. at 381–85.
174. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”); see also
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak clearly
if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”)
(quoting FDA. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
175. See Richardson, supra note 157, at 371–76.
176. Id.
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Making sense of the effect of these doctrines and principles on
Chevron is difficult, but the apparent effect is to create two additional
hurdles for agencies seeking deference. Step One requires there to be
some statutory ambiguity. But if the agency’s interpretation of that
alleged ambiguity substantially increases agency authority, deference
may still not be available under the elephants in mouseholes doctrine.
Instead, a clear statement from Congress—i.e., lack of ambiguity—is
required. And even statutory text strongly in favor of the agency’s
reading can be overcome if the economic or political significance is
sufficient to make it an extraordinary case, which the major questions
doctrine takes out of the Chevron framework entirely. It is, of course,
courts that decide when and whether these three hurdles have been
overcome. All have unclear margins but lie in wait to disarm Chevron
whenever called upon.
D. Empirical Analysis of Chevron
By the mid-2000s, Chevron had matured, with over two decades of
refinement of its analytic process and definition of its scope. As the
preceding discussion illustrates, that evolution had been inexorably in
the direction of a narrower, weaker Chevron, but nevertheless Chevron
had become generally understood as the defining case on agency
interpretations of statutes. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mead, excoriating
the majority for unearthing a by then ancient and discarded Skidmore
deference,177 is perhaps the best evidence of Chevron’s official supremacy.
How powerful and predictive, or how crystalline, was Chevron at that
point? In 2008, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer published a
comprehensive and highly influential analysis of agency statutory
interpretation cases at the Supreme Court. 178 Their dataset included
roughly 1,000 post-Chevron cases decided between 1983 and 2005—so,
including MCI and Brown & Williamson but not Massachusetts.179 On
the one hand, they found that the Court rarely applied Chevron, doing so
in only 28.5 percent of the cases they identify as within Chevron’s scope

177. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239–40 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 57; see also Natalie Salmanowitz & Holger Spamann,
Does the Supreme Court Really Not Apply Chevron When It Should?, 57 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 81, 81 (2019) (characterizing Eskridge & Baer’s Article as “one of the most highly
cited legal empirical articles ever published”).
179. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 57, at 1094. MCI was decided in 1994 and Brown &
Williamson was decided in 2000. MCI Telecomms. Corp v. AT&T Com, 512 U.S. 218 (1994);
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). Massachusetts was decided
in 2007, however. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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as defined by Mead.180 This led Eskridge and Baer to conclude that
“[b]ased upon our data . . . there has not been a Chevron ‘revolution’ at
the Supreme Court level.”181 When applied, however, Chevron did appear
to meaningfully increase agencies’ rate of success: 76.2 percent under
Chevron relative to 68.3 percent in all cases.182 Another empirical study
by Cass Sunstein and Thomas Miles found a slightly lower agency
success rate of 67 percent over cases between 1989 and 2005. 183 The
differences between the two studies’ findings may be due to
methodological differences, or they may indicate that the Court became
less deferential in Chevron cases after 1990.184 Overall, these two
analyses support the view that Chevron was powerful, affecting case
outcomes, and possibly increasing the predictability of those outcomes,
though perhaps not by as much as its reputation would suggest.185
More recent scholarship has cast some doubt on elements of Eskridge
and Baer’s analysis. Natalie Salmanowitz and Holger Spamann’s 2018
research, relying on parties’ briefs in a subset of the same cases analyzed
by Eskridge & Baer, found that the Court actually applied Chevron in a
much greater percentage of applicable cases, at around 80 percent.186 If
this revised estimate is correct, then Chevron looks even more farreaching, at least through 2006. 187
However, both the Salmanowitz/Spamann 80 percent and
Eskridge/Baer 28.5 percent estimates are somewhat misleading in this
regard, as they constrain the denominator to Chevron as circumscribed
by Mead—in other words they take some or all of the doctrinal erosion of
Chevron for granted in defining its ambit.188 Eskridge and Baer’s 8.4
percent estimate, the number of cases applying Chevron relative to their
entire dataset of agency statutory interpretation cases, is the only figure
that does not do this.189 As of 2006, therefore, the case for Chevron’s
power and influence at the Court was mixed. The trend since has been
clearer.
180. Id. at 1124–25.
181. Id. at 1090.
182. Id. at 1099–1100.
183. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825, 849 (2006).
184. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 83–84 (2011).
185. But see id. at 83–85 (concluding from these two and other empirical studies that the
choice of deference doctrines does not matter much for case outcomes).
186. See Salmanowitz & Spamann, supra note 178, at 81, 89.
187. See id. at 83.
188. See id. at 82–83.
189. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 57, at 1125.
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IV. CHEVRON TODAY
A. The Foundations Crumble (2013–15)
Chevron’s decline has accelerated in recent years. Four cases from
2013–15 are particularly important: City of Arlington v. FCC,190 Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,191 King v. Burwell,192 and Michigan v.
EPA.193 They are explored below, followed by an overview of cases in the
last four Court terms, during which Chevron has only once determined a
case’s outcome.
1. City of Arlington v. FCC
City of Arlington v. FCC, decided in 2013, is noteworthy as a nearmiss erosion of Chevron’s power and predictability.194 In the case, the
Court
considered
whether
“jurisdictional”
agency
statutory
interpretations were entitled to Chevron deference.195 In a six to three
opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court said yes,196 over dissent
from Chief Justice Roberts.197 This was not because agency control over
the boundaries of their own authority was not troubling to Justice
Scalia—foxes guarding henhouses is the prevailing metaphor. 198 Instead,
he and the other Justices in the majority rejected a jurisdictional
limitation on Chevron because it would be impossible to administer in
practice.199 In Justice Scalia’s view, it is impossible to draw a line
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions.200 Interpreting
regulatory statutes almost always means deciding whether some class of
behavior comes within the regulatory ambit of an agency.201 In other
words, everything is jurisdictional. “The effect would be to transfer any
number of interpretive decisions . . . from the agencies that administer
the statutes to federal courts.”202

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

569 U.S. 290 (2013).
573 U.S. 302 (2014).
576 U.S. 473 (2015).
576 U.S. 743 (2015).
569 U.S. 290 (2013).
Id. at 293, 307.
Id. at 292, 307.
Id. at 312 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 305–07.
Id. at 304–05.
Id.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 304.
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As Professor Herz has observed, “[f]or Justice Scalia, this was a case
about whether Chevron lived or died. . . . On this account, City of
Arlington is the case that saved Chevron.”203 Carve out jurisdictional
questions, and Chevron loses its heart, or at least its power to affect
outcomes by allocating interpretive authority.204 But had City of
Arlington come out the other way it would have added another explicit
exception to Chevron to the already-long list. What makes a jurisdictional
exclusion fatal to Chevron but not the other exclusions and erosions?
Perhaps it is too big an exclusion or too malleable; this seems to be Justice
Scalia’s view.205 Maybe that is right, but some of the already-established
limitations on Chevron’s scope seem larger, fuzzier, or both, most notably
the major questions doctrine. And the steady growth in the court’s tool
kit and power in Step One has similar effects to those Justice Scalia fears
from a jurisdictional exclusion. Courts and litigants can pick and choose
arguments, and the effect is to “transfer any number of interpretive
decisions” from agencies to the courts.206 What Justice Scalia feared in
City of Arlington had already come to pass years before, as he warned in
Mead or was happy to permit in Brown & Williamson.207
Even the rejection of a jurisdictional exclusion in City of Arlington
may not matter much in the long run. Herz compares Justice Scalia’s
opinion and Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent to ships passing in the night,
having much in common.208 He further argues that courts applying the
case do in practice exclude some “jurisdictional” component of the
interpretive inquiry from Chevron deference, making it effectively part
of “Step Zero.”209 If this view is correct, City of Arlington was not so much
a failed attempt to constrain Chevron as it was a failed attempt to elevate
a common practice into established doctrine. The damage Herz argues
this would do to Chevron was already happening. If Justice Scalia “saved”
Chevron, it was by keeping its erosion from becoming obvious.
Even if one does view City of Arlington as a near miss, its rejection of
a further categorical exclusion did not augur a turn in Chevron’s fortunes,
or even much of a pause in its decline. Assault continued over the next
two Court terms.

203. Herz, supra note 8, at 1900.
204. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 304 (“Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is
Chevron itself.”).
205. See id. at 304–05.
206. Id. at 304.
207. See supra Sections III.A–B.
208. Herz, supra note 8, at 1904–05.
209. Id. at 1905–06.
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2. Utility Air Regulatory Group UARG v. EPA (“UARG”)
The first illustration came in UARG, decided in the next term.210 It
concerned interpretation of a Clean Air Act provision setting emissions
thresholds above which a review and permitting process is required.211 If
rigidly applied, a large number of very small emissions sources would
become subject to EPA regulation—something neither they nor, crucially,
the EPA itself wanted.212 EPA argued that the numerical thresholds in
the statute were an unambiguous directive that it could only avoid
because applying them would lead to “absurd results.”213 The Court
agreed that the statute was unambiguous, but in the opposite direction;
Congress could not have intended for the thresholds to apply to all
pollutants, based on a searching review of similar terms used throughout
the statute.214 In this case, at least, the ambiguity question in Step One
swallowed the range of deference entirely.215 Not just the outcome, but
the arguments in the case would have been no different if it were decided
under Skidmore’s multifactor standard, or even just de novo. UARG was
about the best reading of a statutory provision that, if strictly applied,
would lead to costly and probably unintended results. The Court listened
to the agency’s reading but was unwilling to cede any real interpretive
authority.
UARG is an excellent illustration of how little middle ground is left
in Chevron cases in which deference might operate. The agency said the
statute meant X. The Court said it unambiguously meant Y. UARG is not
unique. The scope of Step One has been expanding, at least since Brown
& Williamson. It is now common for both sides of an interpretive dispute
to claim that their reading of the statute is the only correct or plausible
reading and that they should therefore win at Chevron’s Step One.216 The
210. 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
211. Id. at 307–09.
212. Id. at 310, 312.
213. See id. at 344 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31516–18 (June 3, 2010)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71) (defending refusal to apply Prevention of
Significant Deterioration regulations to small sources as “administrative necessity” that
avoids “absurd results”).
214. Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 315–20.
215. Id. at 315–21. The EPA therefore “lost” the case in the formal sense, but because it
had not really wanted to regulate most of the emissions sources in question anyway, it
ended up with more or less the policy result and regulatory authority it wanted. The EPA’s
entire litigation position was, more or less, “stop me before I regulate again.”
216. It is perhaps unsurprising that parties would so claim; they and their advocates are
likely to see their preferred result as the only plausible reading of a statute. But it is more
surprising when Justices do the same. UARG and Massachusetts are examples, but
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ubiquity of claims of clarity means that cases are really decided at Step
One, before Chevron’s deference is available at all.
Sometimes statutes are clear, of course, but when crystals become
mud, the devil can cite scripture for his purpose. Big, complex statutes
like the Clean Air Act, under which many interpretive cases are decided,
seem particularly vulnerable: it is usually possible to find something in
the statute, somewhere, that supports a given reading, then selectively
cite evidence to support a claim that the reading is clear. The contrast
with Massachusetts is telling: both cases interpreted very similar
language, “any air pollutant,” in the same statute, yet concluded that
language clearly had different meanings.217 If it is possible to do that
without admitting that the language is ambiguous, then the door to
deference at Step Two is effectively closed. Internal erosion of Chevron is
complete.
3. King v. Burwell
External erosion of Chevron continued as well. The Court considered
a particularly high-profile case of agency statutory interpretation in 2015
in King v. Burwell.218 Litigants challenged the federal government’s
implementation of health insurance markets, claiming the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA” or “Obamacare”) only authorized subsidies to those
buying insurance on state-run exchanges.219 The Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) interpreted the statute to allow subsidies for users of both
federal and state exchanges.220 This seemingly technical matter had
major implications; if subsidies were made unavailable to citizens in the
group of states refusing to run their own exchanges, a significant part of
the Obamacare health insurance market could collapse.221 Obamacare’s
high political profile added to the case’s salience.
Nevertheless, the case was a very straightforward matter of
statutory interpretation. Should the text of the statute, authorizing
subsidies for users of exchanges “established by the State,” be construed
sometimes Justices of different opinions assert such in the same case. See supra text
accompanying notes ; see, e.g., Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1475,
1477, 1483 (2020) (majority opinion and Alito, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that both
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent would resolve the interpretive
question at Step One, but with opposite results).
217. Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 316–21; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 528–29 (2007).
218. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
219. Id. at 483.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 492–94.
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narrowly, or should other evidence of congressional intent—context,
history, other enactments or lack thereof, etc.—be interpreted to allow
subsidies for users of federal exchanges?222 The relevant agency adopted
the latter, broader reading.223 Although in a six-to-three opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts the Court agreed, upholding the legality of the
subsidies,224 it explicitly afforded no deference to the agency’s position. 225
Chevron would seem to have required deference, at least unless the
meaning of the statute was clear; in its decision below, the Fourth Circuit
applied Chevron and deferred to the IRS’s interpretation. 226
One option available to the Court was of course to find that the text
of the statute foreclosed the IRS’s interpretation, thereby denying
deference at Chevron Step One; Justice Scalia’s dissent would have done
so.227 Another option would have been to rule that Congress
unambiguously intended the subsidies to be available to users of federal
exchanges, i.e., that the statute was clear in the other direction. If so,
then Chevron deference would be irrelevant. Of course, such a reading of
the statute would be in a great deal of tension with the text of the
relevant provision, making it difficult to conclude with a straight face
that the statute is not ambiguous.228 On the other hand, that did not stop
the Court in Brown & Williamson.
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts rejected both of these options and
admitted that the statute was ambiguous, considering text, context,
purpose, and other factors.229 Having concluded that Congress had not
clearly spoken under the traditional Chevron framework, the Court
should have deferred to the agency. But under the modern, constrained
Chevron, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that no deference was
available, for three reasons—two previously announced, and one new.
First, Chief Justice Roberts applied the elephants in mouseholes clear
statement rule, citing UARG:
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving
billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of
222. Id. at 484–85, 492–93.
223. Id. at 483–84.
224. Id. at 491–94.
225. Id. at 486.
226. Id. at 484.
227. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“You would think the answer would be obvious—
so obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case about it.”);
see also id. at 510 (“If that is all it takes to make something ambiguous, everything is
ambiguous.”).
228. See id. at 485–86.
229. Id. at 485–92.
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health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are
available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep
“economic and political significance” that is central to this
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question
to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.230
Second, the opinion classed the case as “extraordinary,” again citing
Brown & Williamson, explicitly applying the major questions doctrine to
take the case out of Chevron’s domain.231
While not new, both of these doctrines limiting Chevron were given
their clearest endorsement to date in King. Some had argued the major
questions doctrine was dormant or even dead before King was decided.232
Moreover, recall that Brown & Williamson did not explicitly create a new
doctrine; it was ostensibly a Step One case.233 Unless one views the
elephants in mouseholes doctrine as indistinguishable from the major
questions doctrine,234 King was the first Supreme Court case to explicitly
state that “extraordinary cases” were outside Chevron’s domain.235 Law
professors had debated the major questions doctrine at length, 236 but it
had yet to be formally acknowledged by the Court. Therefore, even
without announcing new doctrine, King reduced Chevron’s reach by
solidifying—dare I say, crystallizing—constraints the Court had already
put on deference.
At the same time, King was a missed opportunity to add some clarity
to the major questions doctrine. The actual interpretive question at issue
in the case was relatively minor, in that it involved a single, short
sentence appearing once in the statute, though UARG was far more
complex in this regard, and no broad expansion of IRS authority. 237 But
of course its implications were great; as the opinion discusses, without

230. Id. at 485–86 (quoting Brown & Williamson).
231. Id. at 485.
232. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it
Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 594–95 (2008) (“In Massachusetts v. EPA . . . the Court
dealt a fatal blow to a fledgling, though controversial, doctrine: the ‘major questions’
exception to Chevron deference.”).
233. See discussion supra Section III.B.
234. See Richardson, supra note 158, at 372.
235. See id. at 358.
236. See, e.g., Moncrieff, supra note 232, at 645; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 236.
237. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486, (2015); see also Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302, 308–10, 316–18 (2014). Of course, the ACA itself was a broad regulatory
expansion, and to the extent a small IRS role in subsidies held up the entire statute, that
expansion was at issue in the case, albeit indirectly. See King, 576 U.S. at 486.
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tax subsidies the federal exchanges might fail, and a substantial portion
of the policy changes wrought by the ACA with them.238 This suggests
that the ultimate effects of a statutory interpretation move are what
makes a question “major,” however incremental that interpretive move
is on its own terms. This is in some tension with Brown & Williamson
and the elephants in mouseholes principle, which seem to be driven by
the size of the agency’s claimed increase in authority, such as the FDA’s
claim of authority to regulate tobacco in Brown & Williamson or the
EPA’s claim of authority over small greenhouse gas emitters in UARG.
How much does context matter for determining whether a question is
major? How big of a role does political controversy play? Was King a
major questions case because it made headlines? Given its high political
profile and the economic significance of the healthcare industry, perhaps
King was a clear major questions case. Or perhaps it just barely crossed
the major questions bar. The Court did not say.
The third and final reason Chief Justice Roberts refused to defer was
on the grounds that the IRS lacked the relevant expertise: “It is especially
unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS,
which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort,”
he concluded.239 This deference-denying rationale was new; the Court
had not to my knowledge previously denied deference based on an
assessment of the agency’s expertise. Chief Justice Roberts cited a 2006
case, Gonzales v. Oregon,240 but that case is at most a weak precedent. To
the extent Gonzales relied on the level of agency expertise, it was to
determine which agency should receive deference in the context of a
statute that bifurcates authority among multiple agencies, not whether
an agency or the Court should decide an interpretive question. 241
This new “stay-in-your-lane” limitation on Chevron creates another
hurdle agencies must cross before deference will be made available: they
238. King, 576 U.S. at 492–94.
239. Id. at 486 (emphasis omitted).
240. Id. at 496 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)).
241. 546 U.S. at 265–70. The statute at issue in Gonzales divided authority for
determining whether drugs may be sold between the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and the Attorney General, the former charged with resolving medical and scientific
questions, and the latter legal ones. See id. at 248–55. Because the case concerned an
“interpretive rule” issued unilaterally by the Attorney General, the Court concluded that
whether the interpretation at issue was medical or legal was relevant—if it was medical,
not legal, the Attorney General lacked the authority to issue it. Id. at 265–70. Expertise is
of course relevant in that inquiry, but the inquiry is important only because of the
bifurcated structure of the statute. See id. The ACA also allocated authority to multiple
agencies, but the specific authority at issue in King, that of tax subsidies for users of
exchanges, was exclusively delegated to the IRS. See King, 576 U.S. at 483, 485–86.
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must convince the court that they have the technical chops in the
relevant area. This could easily become a requirement little different
from Skidmore’s “power to persuade” factor—indeed Gonzales
specifically cites this Skidmore requirement after denying deference.242
Returning to King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion that
the IRS lacks the relevant expertise is not at all convincing and
illustrates the degree to which the stay-in-your-lane doctrinal addition
further constrains Chevron. Chief Justice Roberts insinuates that the
IRS has drifted away from its area of expertise—tax—into an area—
health care—where its views carry no weight.243 It is true that the tax
subsidies in question are part of health care policy, but they are still tax
subsidies. The IRS may or may not know much about how to craft health
care policy, i.e. how to set up the exchanges, but it does have expertise on
taxes. Given how much of U.S. federal policy is implemented through the
tax code, denying deference to the IRS whenever a tax measure has
implications beyond revenue, as King appears to do, effects a major
reduction in Chevron’s scope. Congress has not carefully restricted
authority it delegates to agencies to narrow lanes of expertise.
Also, the stay-in-your-lane exception appears to be separate from the
preexisting exclusion from Chevron of statutes administered by multiple
agencies. The Court in King or Gonzales could have easily applied this
exclusion to deny deference, but neither court did so, nor did either
explain why. In both cases, Congress bifurcated authority between
multiple agencies for good reason; in the ACA, it makes a lot of sense to
delegate health policy decisions to HHS and implementation of tax
changes to the IRS. Modern, complex statutes frequently divide authority
in similar ways, or different statutes may compel agencies to regulate in
overlapping areas.244 This undercuts the Court’s assertion that the IRS
lacked relevant expertise. Even if the “multiple agencies” exception is
withering, or only applies to truly general statutes like the APA, then the
newly articulated stay-in-your-lane expertise exclusion is an even more
powerful replacement.
King is important not only as an illustration of modern application of
Chevron’s myriad exceptions, but in that it substantially strengthens
242. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 268–69 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
243. King, 576 U.S. at 485–86.
244. See, e.g., Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324-01 (May 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–538) (example of joint
rulemaking between EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, part of the
Department of Transportation, setting federal fuel economy and emissions standards).
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those exceptions. In applying both the major questions and stay-in-yourlane/expertise exceptions, the King majority unearths principles from
earlier cases—Brown & Williamson and Gonzales, respectively—that
were not decisive in those cases and crystallizes them into rules readily
applicable in future cases. It is entirely possible that, without King, the
major questions doctrine would have withered away, or at most remained
a dormant curiosity, cited and discussed by far more law review Articles
than cases. Now, any agency litigating in the Supreme Court must
consider whether it will be denied deference because the case is too
important.245 In this way, King bootstraps Brown & Williamson and
Gonzales, shielding it from accusations that it is creating new rules and
elevating dicta to doctrine in the process.
4. Michigan v. EPA
In Michigan v. EPA, decided only a few days after King, the Court
again rejected an agency’s statutory interpretation. 246 However, unlike
in King, the Court granted deference but still rejected the agency’s
interpretation as unreasonable, despite that deference.247 In other words,
the EPA suffered the ignominy of an almost unheard-of loss at Chevron
Step Two. 248 The case involved a detailed Clean Air Act issue that is too
complex to describe in depth here. But the short version is that the EPA
was required to evaluate whether regulating certain emissions from coal
power plants was “appropriate and necessary.”249 The agency did so, but
without reference to cost, interpreting “appropriate and necessary” to
require evaluation only of environmental and technical criteria.250
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected this reading of
the statute.251 Justice Scalia admitted that the “appropriate and
necessary” language was ambiguous in that it did not clearly direct EPA
to consider cost,252 but ruled that interpreting as EPA did, ignoring cost
entirely at this threshold stage, was beyond “the bounds of reasonable

245. See Richardson, supra note 157, at 424–25 (discussing implications of the major
questions doctrine for the Clean Power Plan, an Obama-era attempt to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from power plants).
246. 576 U.S. 743, 759–60 (2015).
247. Id. at 751, 759 (characterizing EPA’s reading of the statute as “unreasonable”).
248. Kent H. Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–45 (2018).
249. Michigan, 576 U.S. at 747–49.
250. See id. at 749–50.
251. Id. at 760.
252. Id. at 752 (“[T]his term leaves agencies with flexibility.”).
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interpretation.”253 This was not because, in the majority’s view, the EPA’s
interpretation was incompatible with the text—as Justice Scalia
concedes, “[t]here are undoubtedly settings in which the phrase
‘appropriate and necessary’ does not encompass cost.” 254 Nevertheless,
context dictated a reading that the text alone did not; as the Court held,
“[r]ead naturally in the present context, the phrase ‘appropriate and
necessary’ requires at least some attention to cost.”255
One possible interpretation of Michigan is that it signals further
erosion of Chevron deference. It could signal increased willingness on the
Court to overrule agency interpretations of admittedly ambiguous
provisions. If such Step Two losses for agencies were to become common,
then it would become clear that Chevron’s core is empty. Previous
erosions have limited access to deference by explicitly restricting
Chevron’s scope, or by implicitly expanding judges’ ability to deny
deference at Step One. 256 Expanding Step Two would cut to Chevron’s
heart—Step Two is where the deference magic happens. Past expansion
of grounds for denying deference at Step One provides a ready model for
erosion of Step Two—scattered case outcomes may gradually crystallize
into categories of interpretations that the court deems presumptively or
per se unreasonable.
It is possible that in retrospect Michigan will be the first step along
this path. It is, in my view, a strong assertion of broad judicial authority
at Chevron Step Two. In other words, I do not view the agency’s
interpretation as particularly unusual, much less unreasonable. As the
dissent in Michigan puts it:
Judges may interfere only if the Agency’s way of ordering its
regulatory process is unreasonable—i.e., something Congress
would never have allowed. The question here, as in our seminal
case directing courts to defer to agency interpretations of their
own statutes [Chevron], arises “not in a sterile textual vacuum,
but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical
and complex arena.” . . . EPA’s experience and expertise . . . —
and courts’ lack of those attributes—demand that judicial review
proceed with caution and care. The majority actually phrases this
principle well, though honors it only in the breach: Within wide
bounds, it is “up to the Agency to decide . . . how to account for
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 751 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014)).
Id. at 752.
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.
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cost.” . . . That judges might have made different regulatory
choices—might have considered costs in different ways at
different times—will not suffice to overturn EPA’s action where
Congress, as here, chose not to speak directly to those matters,
but to leave them to the Agency to decide.257
If the majority had announced a general rule that agency
interpretations of ambiguous provisions not requiring consideration of
costs are presumptively unreasonable, it would be a substantial
constraint on Chevron deference. Not announcing such a rule but
implying that similar interpretations will not receive deference does even
more damage to Chevron’s predictability for agencies.
But reasonable people may disagree about whether an interpretation
is reasonable, and disagreement about whether Chevron dictates a
particular case’s outcome is not good evidence, alone, that deference is
being weakened. The Court in Michigan announces no new doctrinal
rule, merely an application of Step Two’s reasonableness constraint,
something present since Chevron was decided. Judges have always had
the right to reject at least some agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes. Chevron is, after all, a deference doctrine, not an abdication
doctrine. Michigan is unusual because the power to reject agency
interpretations at Step Two has been used so rarely, not because that
power is new.
Refusal to defer at Step Two may not even, in reality, be quite so
unusual. A common view, perhaps the consensus view, among academics
is that Step Two is indistinguishable from State Farm-style arbitrary and
capricious review under the APA. 258 This, too, is a deferential standard,
but agencies do lose these cases from time to time. 259 So perhaps
Michigan is not so radical. Time will tell whether it is an outlier or the
harbinger of erosion of deference at Step Two. At a minimum it is a shot
across the bow of agencies.
At the same time, Justice Thomas thought Justice Scalia’s opinion
did not go far enough. In concurrence, he explicitly called for Chevron to
be reconsidered on separation of powers grounds.260 This would become a
recurring pattern for Justice Thomas in Chevron cases over the next few
years.

257. Id. at 771 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
258. See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 42, at 603–04.
259. See VERMEULE, supra note 13, at 158 (finding a 92% win rate for agencies in
arbitrariness challenges at the Supreme Court).
260. Michigan, 576 U.S. at 760–62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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B. The Death of Deference (2016–20)
Michigan, UARG, and City of Arlington are not unique. In the years
since they were decided, the Court has continued to show little or no
appetite for meaningful deference to agencies. At the same time, open
criticism of Chevron has risen to the surface. The result has been a total
collapse of deference to agency statutory interpretations at the Supreme
Court level. Three patterns in Chevron’s treatment at the Court over the
2015–16 through 2019–20 terms illustrate the decline in deference.
First, the Court cites Chevron much less than it used to. This decline
appears to be a long-term trend. Thomas Merrill found in 1992 that the
Court considered whether to defer to an agency in about ten to twenty
statutory interpretation cases per year.261 Linda Jellum found that by
2006 this had declined; she identified three citations to Chevron in
majority opinions in the 2005–06 term, only one in the 2004–05 term, and
four in the 2003–04 term.262 Because Merrill counted any case with
discussion of deference, even by dissenting or concurring Justices, 263 this
is not an apples-to-apples comparison. Merrill does, however, separately
record a rate of about four to five Supreme Court cases per term in which
the Court not only cited but applied Chevron, setting a lower bound on
the possible number of annual citations.264 Jellum’s rate of around three
citations per term in the 2000s remains about the same today—Chevron
was cited in majority opinions fifteen times since the 2015–16 term, an
average of exactly three times per term, and never more than five
times.265 To some extent this decline is surely due to a parallel decline in
the number of cases the Court decides, something Jellum notes in 2006
as well.266 In fact, the continuing decline in Court opinions since 2006 267
without a corresponding decline in Chevron citations could be taken to

261. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 980–81 & tbl.1. (1992) (counting all cases handling deference questions in Column A).
262. See Jellum, supra note 9, at 772–73.
263. See Merrill, supra note 261, at 981 n.51.
264. Id. at 81 & tbl.1 (showing the different count in Column C).
265. See infra Table 1 and accompanying citations. Note that this count does not include
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), which extensively cites Chevron but is instead an
application of the related Auer/Seminole Rock deference standard for agency
interpretations of their own regulations.
266. Jellum, supra note 9, at 773.
267. See Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: Something We Haven’t Seen in the
Supreme Court Since the Civil War, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/empirical-scotus-something-we-havent-seen-in-the-supremecourt-since-the-civil-war/ (describing long-term decline in the number of cases the Court
decides).
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suggest that Chevron has risen slightly in significance since then, though
with just a few citations per year such small differences are unlikely to
mean much.
Second, the decline in citations to Chevron should not be taken to
indicate a simple decline in the number of agency statutory
interpretation cases. In recent cases, the Court has sometimes failed to
mention Chevron at all, despite an agency interpretation of a statute
being at issue.268 The number of such cases is hard to determine precisely,
and whether it has declined depends on what one takes to be the best
measure of the past rate, whether the 28.5 percent found by Eskridge &
Baer, or the roughly 80 percent found by Salmanowitz and Spamann. 269
Scholars have noted a particular trend on the Court of failing or refusing
to cite Chevron in immigration cases.270 No immigration exception to
Chevron has been formally announced and the Court does still cite it in
some immigration cases,271 but some scholars have suggested it can now
be added to the categories of explicit exceptions already established. 272
As Michael Kagan describes the Court’s approach in a 2019 case:
The statutory interpretation problem was [a] close enough
question that it divided the Supreme Court 5-4. The Solicitor
General spent three pages in his opening brief arguing for
Chevron deference, and then another three pages on it in his
reply. The Respondents argued strongly that Chevron should not
apply. Chevron seemed important to everyone involved. Except

268. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct.
893 (2019); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367 (2020).
269. See discussion supra Section III.D.
270. See generally Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491
(2019).
271. See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018) (declining to reach a
Chevron analysis).
272. See Amy L. Moore, Slouching Towards Oblivion: Divergent Implementation and
Potential Exodus of Chevron Analysis in the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Immigration
Law, 87 UMKC L. REV. 549, 588–89, 596 (2019) (arguing the Court’s refusal to cite Chevron
in immigration contexts is due in part to overlap with the criminal law exclusion). See
generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron
Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197 (2021) (arguing the exception is
appropriate).
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for the nine who mattered most. They acted like Chevron doesn’t
exist.273
The Court’s recent decision, sans Chevron citation, in Little Sisters of
the Poor v. Pennsylvania 274 is of particular note. There, the Court
considered longstanding and controversial agency interpretations of the
ACA, but the majority opinion makes no mention of Chevron specifically
or the weight of the agency’s views more generally.275 This is perhaps no
surprise given that its author is long-time Chevron critic Justice
Thomas,276 but in other contexts discussed below277, he has noted his
objections to Chevron in dissent or in a concurrence in the judgment. The
burden of retaining votes for a majority opinion likely meant such an
attack was off the table in Little Sisters. Justice Thomas’s solution was
simply to ignore Chevron. This omission did not escape Justice Kagan’s
attention; in her concurrence in the judgment, she argues “Chevron
deference was built for cases like these.”278
Third and finally, when the court has cited Chevron in recent years,
it has not helped agencies much, if at all. The Court has considered an
agency’s interpretation of a statute and cited Chevron in the majority
opinion in fifteen cases decided since Michigan and King in 2015.279 In
only one of those fifteen, Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, did the Court
defer to the agency’s interpretation.280 In two other cases, the Court
agreed with the agency’s interpretation but held that deference was
irrelevant because the statute’s meaning was clear—in other words, the
agency won but Chevron was irrelevant to the outcome.281
In the remaining twelve cases, the Court rejected agency
interpretations and denied Chevron deference, either because a majority
of Justices thought that the statute was clearly contrary to the agency’s
interpretation at Step One, or because some exception to Chevron took it
out of the doctrine’s scope.282 Three out of fifteen cases is not a good
success rate for agencies; in fact no agency has won a Chevron case in
273. Michael Kagan, Chevron Goes Missing in an Immigration Case. Again., YALE J. ON
REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-goesmissing-in-an-immigration-case-again/ (citations omitted).
274. 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
275. See id. at 2372–74, 2380–81.
276. Id. at 2371.
277. See infra Section IV.C.1.
278. Id. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring).
279. See infra Table 1.
280. 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
281. See infra Table 1.
282. See infra Table 1; see also infra Part III.
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more than three years since Coventry Health Care of Missouri v. Nevils
was decided in April 2017. 283 Moreover, controlling the outcome of one
out of fifteen cases is slim pickings for a doctrine that is alleged to be, and
once was, so important. A sample size of fifteen may be too small to draw
firm conclusions about what rate to expect in the future. But it is not a
good sign for Chevron. When examined in more detail, these cases all
illustrate how far Chevron deference has declined.
Table 1
Agency
Defer?
win?

Case

Citation

Author

Votes284

FERC v. Electric
Power Supply
Ass’n

136 S. Ct.
760
(1/25/2016)

Kagan

6-2

Yes

No

Kingdomware
Technologies,
Inc. v. United
States

136 S. Ct.
1969
(6/16/2016)

Thomas

9-0

No

No

Cuozzo Speed
Technologies,
LLC v. Lee

136 S. Ct.
2131
(6/20/2016)

Breyer

9-0

Yes

Yes

Encino
Motorcars, LLC
v. Navarro

136 S. Ct.
2117
(6/20/2016)

Kennedy

7-2

No

No

Coventry Health
Care of
Missouri, Inc. v.
Nevils

137 S. Ct.
1190
(4/18/2017)

Ginsburg

8-0

Yes

No

EsquivelQuintana v.
Sessions

137 S. Ct.
1562
(5/30/2017)

Thomas

8-0

No

No

Digital Realty
Trust, Inc. v.
Somers

138 S. Ct.
767
(2/21/2018)

Ginsburg

9-0

No

No

283. See infra Table 1.
284. These vote tallies do not separately count concurrences, which in some cases do not
adopt the majority’s reasoning with regard to Chevron. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Agency
Defer?
win?

Case

Citation

Author

Votes284

SAS Institute,
Inc. v. Iancu

138 S. Ct.
1348
(4/24/2018)

Gorsuch

5-4

No

No

Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis

138 S. Ct.
1612
(5/21/2018)

Gorsuch

5-4

No

No

Wisconsin
Central Ltd. v.
United States

138 S. Ct.
2067
(6/21/2018)

Gorsuch

5-4

No

No

Pereira v.
Sessions

138 S. Ct.
2105
(6/21/2018)

Sotomayor

8-1

No

No

Sturgeon v.
Frost

139 S. Ct.
1066
(3/26/2019)

Kagan

9-0

No

No

Smith v.
Berryhill

139 S. Ct.
1765
(5/28/2019)

Sotomayor

9-0

No

No

PDR Network v.
Carlton &
Harris
Chiropractic,
Inc.

139 S. Ct.
2051
(6/20/2019)

Breyer

9-0

No

No

County of Maui
v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund

140 S. Ct.
1462
(4/23/2020)

Breyer

6-3

No

No

Even in the cases in which the agency prevailed, Chevron deference
seems to have played little role. In Cuozzo—the only case in which the
majority explicitly granted deference—the agency prevailed nine to
zero.285 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer’s conclusion in the majority opinion
that deference was due prompted a blistering concurrence, if that is not
a contradiction in terms, from Justice Thomas. Thomas openly
questioned whether Chevron should remain good law, noting that, in his
view, the outcome was dictated by the clear meaning of the statute, not
285.

Id. at 2142; see supra Table 1.
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deference.286 The Court would almost certainly have reached the same
result with or without deference.
In the other two cases in which the agency prevailed, Coventry Health
Care v. Nevils and FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Kagan respectively were careful to make clear that
Chevron deference played no role in the outcome.287 This suggests that
applying Chevron deference is toxic on the Court and risks losing votes
for an opinion. Chevron deference is supposed to increase the chances of
an agency prevailing by compelling a marginal Justice to accept an
agency position they view as reasonable but wrong, or at least secondbest.288 Chevron today does the opposite, repelling some of the Justices
and possibly reducing the chances of agency success.
In the remaining twelve cases in which agency interpretations were
rejected by the Court, Chevron deference was denied on a variety of
grounds. The most common was simple rejection of the agency
interpretation as contrary to clear congressional intent at Step One,
focused almost entirely on the statutory text; the Court decided seven 289

286. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2148 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision does not
rest on Chevron’s fiction that ambiguity in a statutory term is best construed as an implicit
delegation of power to an administrative agency to determine the bounds of the law. In an
appropriate case, this Court should reconsider that fiction of Chevron and its progeny.”
(citing Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring))).
287. See Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 n.3 (2017)
(“Because the statute alone resolves this dispute, we need not consider whether Chevron
deference attaches.”); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 773 n.5 (2016)
(“Because we think FERC’s authority clear, we need not address the Government’s
alternative contention that FERC’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference
under Chevron.”).
288. See Breyer, supra note 22, at 379.
289. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1979 (2016) (“[W]e
do not defer to the agency when the statute is unambiguous.”); Esquivel-Quintana v.
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (“[T]he statute, read in context, unambiguously
forecloses the Board’s interpretation.”); Digit. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782
(2018) (“Because ‘Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,’ we do not
accord deference to the contrary view advanced by the SEC.” (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984))); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358
(2018) (“[A]fter applying traditional tools of interpretation here, we are left with no
uncertainty that could warrant deference.”); Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2067, 2074 (2018) (“[I]n light of all the textual and structural clues before us, we think it’s
clear enough that the term ‘money’ excludes ‘stock,’ leaving no ambiguity for the agency to
fill.”); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018) (“[T]he Court need not resort to
Chevron deference . . . for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous answer to the
interpretive question at hand.”); Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1080 n.3 (2019)
(“Because we see, for the reasons given below, no ambiguity as to Section 103(c)’s meaning,
we cannot give deference to the Park Service’s contrary construction.”).
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or perhaps eight290 of these cases at Step One. Other grounds for denying
deference included application of the stay-in-your-lane principle,291
Mead’s “force of law” requirement,292 and the exclusion for
interpretations affecting the scope of judicial review.293 Another rejected
Chevron deference due to the agency’s procedural error.294 These opinions
withholding deference were authored by seven different Justices:
Sotomayor, Kagan, Breyer, Gorsuch, Ginsburg, Thomas, and Kennedy. 295
No Justice wrote more majority opinions than Justice Gorsuch’s three. 296
This suggests a broad consensus in favor of a robust, nearly allencompassing, and predominantly textualist Step One, though again the
sample size warrants caution.
One case established what appears to be a new Chevron exception,
denying deference to an independent agency’s interpretation of a statute
because the Solicitor General (“S.G.”) in an amicus brief offered a
contrary interpretation.297 This has implications for Presidential
290. The most recent Chevron case, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, applies
Chevron somewhat cryptically; it is unclear if the agency loses at Step One or Step Two.
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020). Justice Breyer’s majority opinion notes that no party has asked for
Chevron deference before finding nevertheless that the EPA’s reading “is neither
persuasive nor reasonable,” terms that appear in Chevron’s Step Two. Id. at 1474. But the
opinion’s subsequent statutory analysis supporting this interpretation is indistinguishable
from typical Step One analysis. Id. at 1475 (“EPA’s oblique argument . . . cannot overcome
the statute’s structure, its purposes, or the text of the provisions that actually govern.”).
Some have read County of Maui to adopt a “Chevron waiver” doctrine under which
deference is not given if an agency fails to ask for it. See Kristin E. Hickman, County of
Maui & Chevron Waiver—Let’s Not Get Carried Away, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/county-of-maui-chevron-waiver-letsnot-get-carried-away/.
291. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018) (“[O]n no account might
we agree that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to address the meaning
of a second statute it does not administer.”).
292. See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051,
2055–56 (2019) (holding that a lower court was not bound by an agency interpretive rule
that had not undergone notice and comment but refusing to reach whether such an agency
interpretation should be given Chevron deference); see also United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
293. See Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2019) (“The scope of judicial review,
meanwhile, is hardly the kind of question that the Court presumes that Congress implicitly
delegated to an agency.”).
294. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“Chevron
deference is not warranted where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’—that is, where
the agency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.”)
(quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 227).
295. See supra Table 1.
296. See supra Table 1.
297. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (“[H]ere the Executive
seems of two minds, for we have received competing briefs from the Board and from the
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authority over independent agencies; apparently the President or DOJ
leadership may deny an agency access to Chevron deference to their
interpretations of statutes by taking an alternative position in briefs.
This contrasts with the Court’s longstanding position that agency
litigating positions do not get deference because they lack the force of law
or have inadequate procedural underpinnings.298 Apparently, the
procedural requirements for denying deference are much lower than
those for obtaining it.
In short, the Court has shown almost no inclination in recent years
to defer to agency statutory interpretations. Chevron’s two-step inquiry
to some extent remains the lingua franca of agency statutory
interpretation cases, but not always; the Court regularly fails to cite it at
all. Even when it does, deference is rarely if ever actually available. No
agency has won a case at the Supreme Court in which the majority cited
Chevron in nearly four years.299 Agencies won zero of ten cases over that
period.300 As noted above, in the context of Massachusetts, UARG, and
Brown & Williamson, the modern understanding of Step One at the
Court is broad enough to allow most any result.301 That makes the
deference available at Step Two almost impossible for agencies to access.
Majority opinions in recent years have mostly dispensed with
Chevron quickly, resolving cases at Step One such that deference never
comes into play.302 This should perhaps come as no surprise given the
expansion of Step One, but the open antipathy by a faction of the Court
to Chevron makes appeal to deference doctrines at least less useful for
attracting votes, and possibly counterproductive. This is particularly
ironic because Chevron’s ability to drive case outcomes was its ability to
attract or compel votes in favor of the agency’s interpretation by Justices
who disagreed with that interpretation. If Chevron meant anything, it
was that some Justices would vote to uphold the agency interpretation
under deference who would not have done so under a de novo standard,
or perhaps under Skidmore.303
United States (through the Solicitor General) disputing the meaning of the NLRA. And
whatever argument might be mustered for deferring to the Executive on grounds of political
accountability, surely it becomes a garble when the Executive speaks from both sides of its
mouth, articulating no single position on which it might be held accountable.”).
298. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988).
299. See supra Table 1.
300. See supra Table 1.
301. See supra Section IV.A.2.
302. See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text.
303. Some scholars have characterized Chevron in this sense as a voting rule, requiring
a supermajority to overrule agency interpretations. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian
Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 709 (2007).
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Now, citing Chevron appears to have the opposite effect, driving away
votes; only supermajorities are able to uphold agency interpretations
while explicitly granting deference. Narrow agency wins, it seems, have
to fall within an explicit Chevron exclusion or be framed as Step One
cases, in which the agency reading is unambiguously correct. Two or
three Justices seem unwilling to join an opinion deferring to an agency
under Chevron even if they agree with the result.304 A good portion of the
time the Court does not cite Chevron in agency statutory interpretation
cases at all. Even when there are sufficient votes to support the agency’s
position, the Court seems reluctant to admit that deference plays any role
in the result. Increasingly, it seems, it does not.
In short, there appears to be little if any scope for Chevron deference
at the Supreme Court level. Chevron lives, but deference is dead.
It is important to reiterate that this analysis is restricted to the
Supreme Court. Chevron’s erosion appears to be much more severe and
rapid there than in the lower federal courts. Recent work by Kent Barnett
and Christopher Walker indicates that Chevron still has substantial
influence on case outcomes in the circuit courts.305 As they observe, there
are big differences between “Chevron Supreme” and “Chevron
Regular.”306 One might therefore conclude that the decline of deference
at the Supreme Court is not that important. Five cases or so per term is
not very much. That may be true, but the cases that reach the Court are
the highest-profile and most significant. Major public policy issues like
health care, climate change, and immigration involve agency action for
which, at the margin, statutory interpretation questions abound. Also, I
am skeptical that a different “Chevron Regular” and “Chevron Supreme”
can persist forever. Now-Justice Kavanaugh, whose criticisms of Chevron
are detailed below, readily observed while still on the D.C. Circuit that
“the Supreme Court itself has been reining in Chevron in the last few
years.”307 Now-Justice Gorsuch more or less begged the Court to revisit

304. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
305. See generally Barnett & Walker, supra note 14.
306. Id. at 1, 6.
307. Kavanaugh, supra note 388, at 2150–51; see infra Section IV.C.3.
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Chevron while on the Tenth Circuit.308 A survey of appellate judges in
2018 also suggests significant skepticism about Chevron.309
C. Chevron Under Attack
1. The Old Guard
At the same time as the Court has consistently denied deference to
agencies at the Supreme Court, open criticism of Chevron has become en
vogue among some Justices. Concurring in Michigan, Justice Thomas
criticized Chevron as inconsistent with Marbury and Article III, stopping
just short of calling for it to be overturned: “[W]e seem to be straying
further and further from the Constitution without so much as pausing to
ask why. We should stop to consider that document before blithely giving
the force of law to any other agency ‘interpretations’ of federal
statutes.”310 Since Michigan, Thomas has continued to call for Chevron
to be reconsidered at every opportunity,311 most recently recommending
not only Chevron but his own opinion in Brand X, extending deference to
agency interpretations that contradict early judicial interpretations, to
be rejected.312
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Pereira v. Sessions,
published a week before his retirement, was written explicitly “to note
[his] concern with the way in which the Court’s opinion in [Chevron] has
come to be understood and applied.”313 For Justice Kennedy:
The type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases is
troubling. . . . Given the concerns raised by some Members of this

308. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that
seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.
Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”).
309. See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1348
(2018) (“Although every judge we interviewed told us that he or she was bound by
Chevron—and all but one of the judges did apply that rule in opinions—most of the judges
we interviewed do not favor the Chevron rule.”).
310. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761–64 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
311. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
312. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 690–91 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
313. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
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Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an
appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how
courts have implemented that decision. The proper rules for
interpreting statutes and determining agency jurisdiction and
substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional
separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of
the Judiciary.314
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is somewhat puzzling, or at least the
venue he chose for it is. In Pereira, the majority in an opinion by Justice
Sotomayor denied deference on Step One grounds315—hardly the
“reflexive deference” that Justice Kennedy criticizes. If Chevron
deference was ever “reflexive,” it certainly was not by 2017 when Pereira
was decided. Justice Alito’s dissent in the same case makes for a more
effective Chevron critique. He would have upheld the agency’s
interpretation and criticizes the majority for failing to defer. 316 This move
may be rhetorically effective, trolling the liberal Justices that have
historically been more willing to defer, but should not be taken as
evidence that Justice Alito really values Chevron deference; in the same
dissent he calls it “once celebrated, and now increasingly maligned
precedent.”317 Occasionally, Justice Alito joins in the Chevron-bashing,
though he has not called for it to be rejected.
Critique of Chevron is not entirely restricted to the Court’s
conservative/Republican-appointed Justices. Justice Breyer has long
advocated a narrow reading of Chevron, dating back to his 1986
Article.318 More recently, he argued in dissent in SAS Institute for
Chevron to be treated as a mere “a rule of thumb” guided in part by the
degree to which the interpreting agency has brought to bear its unique
expertise, rather than a “rigid, black-letter rule of law.”319 The three
other liberal/Democratic-appointed Justices joined the dissent.320

314. Id. at 2120–21 (citations omitted).
315. Id. at 2113 (majority opinion).
316. Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting).
317. Id.
318. See Breyer, supra note 22, at 373 (“To read Chevron as laying down a blanket rule,
applicable to all agency interpretations of law, such as ‘always defer to the agency when the
statute is silent,’ would be seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes
senseless.”).
319. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 1360. For a list of current and former Justices, indicating their respective
appointing presidents, see Current Members, SUPREME COURT U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
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Chevron’s cousin, deference to agency interpretations of their own
regulation under Auer v. Robbins 321 and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.,322 has come under particularly strong criticism. Most notable is
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, in
which he called for Auer to be overturned.323 In critiquing Auer, however,
Justice Scalia suggested that his longstanding support for Chevron has
perhaps waned as well.324 Justice Scalia was troubled by agencies’
issuance of “interpretive rules” that in effect create new law and by
courts’ willingness to defer to agencies when these rules are litigated. 325
For Justice Scalia, Auer deference is the source of much of the trouble,
but for him “[t]he problem is bad enough, and perhaps insoluble if
Chevron is not to be uprooted, with respect to interpretive rules setting
forth agency interpretation of statutes.”326 Justice Scalia seems to be
whistling past Chevron’s graveyard. Justice Alito has publicly claimed
that Justice Scalia had begun to question the wisdom of Chevron before
his death in 2016. 327
2. Justice Gorsuch
Though of course we will never know how Justice Scalia’s views on
Chevron would have evolved, the Justice who replaced him has made his
skepticism clear. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira cites Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent in City of Arlington and Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Michigan as examples of “concerns raised by some
Members of this Court” about Chevron; it also cites then-Tenth Circuit
Judge Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.328 In
that case, the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Gorsuch, ruled in
favor of the agency’s interpretation of a statute, applying Chevron
321. 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997).
322. 325 U.S. 410, 413–14, 417–18 (1945).
323. See 575 U.S. 92, 112 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 109–10 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Heedless of the original design of the APA,
we have developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes and
regulations.
Never
mentioning
§ 706’s
directive
that
the
‘reviewing
court . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions,’ we have held that agencies may
authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes.”) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
325. Id. at 110–11.
326. Id. at 111.
327. Adam White, More on Justice Scalia’s Doubts About Chevron, YALE J. ON REGUL.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/more-on-justice-scaliasdoubts-about-chevron/ (“Before his death, Nino was also rethinking the whole question of
Chevron deference.”).
328. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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deference.329 Judge Gorsuch also wrote a concurrence to his own opinion
to criticize that deference, calling alleged tension between Chevron and
the Constitution “an elephant in the room” and suggesting that “[m]aybe
the time has come to face the behemoth.” 330 The concurrence is a
sweeping and detailed philippic against Chevron; in particular it uses the
various exceptions to Chevron, such as the exclusion of criminal statutes
and Mead, lack of clarity about the tools available at Step One, and other
inconsistencies to critique the foundational assumptions of implied
delegation and agency expertise that undergird deference. 331 Not
everyone is a fan, however: Asher Steinberg calls the Gutierrez-Brizuela
concurrence “the most half-baked critique of Chevron one is likely to
encounter outside of a law school classroom.”332
In any case, most of the concurrence reads like a Supreme Court
opinion winding up to overrule Chevron. But, of course, all then-Judge
Gorsuch can do at the end is send a plea to the Court, asking it to do what
he cannot. As he plaintively puts it, “[w]e managed to live with the
administrative state before Chevron. We could do it again. Put simply, it
seems to me that in a world without Chevron very little would change—
except perhaps the most important things.”333
Of course, now-Justice Gorsuch will play a role in any decision on
whether to overturn Chevron. His concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela
establishes him as a clear vote to do so and, since joining the court, he
has joined Justice Thomas as one of Chevron’s most consistent critics. In
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority,
applies Chevron, but not before noting that “[n]o party . . . has asked us
to reconsider Chevron deference.”334 This is hard to interpret as anything
other than an invitation to litigants to challenge Chevron directly in the
future. In SAS Institute v. Iancu, Justice Gorsuch again punts invitingly,
“whether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another
day.”335 In BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos, Justice Gorsuch, in a dissenting
opinion joined by Justice Thomas, refers to “mounting criticism of

329. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1148–49 (10th Cir. 2016).
330. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch evidently loves big metaphors
for Chevron, also calling it a “colossus.” Id. at 1151.
331. Id. at 1149–58.
332. See Asher Steinberg, Judge Gorsuch and Chevron Doctrine Part III: The GutierrezBrizuela Concurring Opinion, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 29, 2017),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-part-ii-the-gutierrez-brizuelaconcurring-opinion-by-asher-steinberg/.
333. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1158.
334. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629–32 (2018).
335. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018).
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Chevron deference” and notes with satisfaction the litigants’ reluctance,
and majority opinion’s refusal, to rely on it.336 And most recently in PDR
Network v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Justice Gorsuch joins Justice
Thomas in a concurrence in the judgment that questions the
constitutionality of Chevron, alleging it is possibly inconsistent with the
Vesting Clause in Article III.337 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch now seem
to take shots at Chevron almost every time the opportunity to do so
arises.338
3. Justice Kavanaugh
What about the newest Justice? Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s views on
Chevron are more nuanced than Justice Gorsuch’s, though broadly still
skeptical. In his previous position on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh
participated in a large number of administrative law cases; in fact, the
majority of his written opinions at that level reviewed agency
decisions.339 In those cases, Justice Kavanaugh’s treatment of agencies
did not stand out among his peers as particularly skeptical or deferential;
he voted in favor of agency interpretations roughly 75 percent of the time,
in twenty-five of thirty-three cases.340 This is slightly more deferential
than all judges in their 71 percent341 and substantially more deferential
than the Supreme Court at the time he joined. 342 Of course, Justice
Kavanaugh was constrained by Supreme Court doctrine, including
Chevron, while on the D.C. Circuit, so this pattern does not necessarily
reflect how he views that doctrine. But on the other hand, there is no
Guttierrez-Brizuela, anti-Chevron opinion in Justice Kavanaugh’s D.C.
Circuit record, despite many opportunities.
Justice Kavanaugh’s most extensive comments on Chevron come not
from an opinion, but from a 2016 book review in the Harvard Law

336. 139 S. Ct. 893, 908–09 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
337. PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2057
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
338. But see Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) (dismissing
agency position at Step One in a majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch featuring a
straightforward, albeit cursory, application of Chevron).
339. See Adam Feldman, The Next Nominee to the Supreme Court, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/12/07/the-next-nominee/.
340. See Kent Barnett et al., Judge Kavanaugh, Chevron Deference, and the Supreme
Court, REGUL. REV. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boydwalker-kavanaugh-chevron-deference-supreme-court/.
341. Id.
342. See supra Table 1.
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Review.343 In it, Justice Kavanaugh criticized Chevron, among other
interpretive canons and doctrines, as distractions from the core judicial
task of textualist statutory interpretation.344 Chevron, he argued, is an
“atextual invention by courts” that shifts too much power to agencies. 345
Nevertheless, he argued, “Chevron makes a lot of sense in certain
circumstances.”346 Chevron should not be rejected entirely, he argued, but
rather should be limited to “cases involving statutes using broad and
open-ended terms” rather than “a specific statutory term or phrase,”
though he offers little guidance for telling the difference. 347
Some scholars claim Justice Kavanaugh’s record shows he has
“embraced a strong version” of the major questions doctrine. 348 In United
States Telecom Association v. FCC, Justice Kavanaugh argued in dissent
from a denial of rehearing en banc that the FCC lacked clear
authorization from Congress to issue rules on net neutrality and that
deference was not due for this “major rule.”349 Dan Deacon argues this
“major rules” variant is no mere restatement of the existing major
questions doctrine, but rather an expansion and “weaponiz[ation]” of
it.350 In Justice Kavanaugh’s framing, agencies cannot take “major
regulatory action[s] without clear congressional authorization.” 351 This is
different and, Deacon argues, far broader than the Supreme Court’s
major questions doctrine.352 It also, he argues, imposes an antiregulatory bias.353 Jody Freeman notes that Justice Kavanaugh focused
questioning in oral arguments during the D.C. Circuit’s review of the
Obama EPA’s Clean Power Plan on whether it was too significant to
qualify for deference.354
Additional evidence that Justice Kavanaugh may take a narrow view
of deference is his view on the amount of certainty needed to judicially
343. See generally Kavanaugh, supra note 38.
344. Id. at 2144–45, 2150.
345. Id. at 2150–51.
346. Id. at 2152.
347. Id. at 2153–54.
348. See Christopher Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation
of Powers, SCOTUSBLOG (July 26, 2018, 2:55 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/
kavanaugh-on-administrative-law-and-separation-of-powers/.
349. See 855 F.3d 381, 417–18 (2017) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
350. Daniel Deacon, Judge Kavanaugh and “Weaponized Administrative Law,” YALE J.
ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 11, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judgekavanaugh-and-weaponized-administrative-law-by-daniel-deacon/.
351. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 420 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
352. See Deacon, supra note 350.
353. Id.
354. See Amanda Reilly, Would Kavanaugh Limit the Chevron Doctrine?, E&E NEWS
(July 10, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060088675.
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dispose of an interpretive question rather than defer to an agency, i.e.
decide at Chevron Step One. In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, some judges
might require 90 percent certainty, but “I probably apply something . . .
approaching a 65/35 or 60/40 rule. In other words, if it is 60/40 clear, it’s
not ambiguous—don’t resort to [Chevron deference].”355 This suggests a
very expansive view of Step One, in line with the Supreme Court’s
current vision or perhaps even more expansive. A statutory provision
more ambiguous than Justice Kavanaugh’s 60/40 certainty is near or
equivalent to “absolute equipoise”; as Justice Scalia observed in 1989, a
Chevron deference doctrine restricted to such cases “becomes virtually
meaningless.”356 Nevertheless, Justice Kavanaugh cannot be right that
his approach to Step One is so different from other judges; as noted above,
he defers to agency interpretations slightly more often than average. 357
Perhaps his self-judgment is inaccurate, or perhaps it reflects how he
would really like to rule, if he had the authority to do so—as he now does
on the Court. Alternatively, maybe it is his assessment of other judges
that is wrong and far less than 90 percent certainty is typically needed
to deny deference. The Supreme Court cases suggest as much, but the
persistently high success rate of agencies in the circuit courts does not.
So far, Justice Kavanaugh has not said much about Chevron from the
Supreme Court bench. His most notable non-statement is his refusal to
join Justice Thomas’ Chevron critique in PDR; he wrote his own
concurrence in the judgment, which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
joined,358 but he was unwilling to join theirs. That could suggest he is not
as critical as they are of deference, but I would be cautious before reading
much into it at all, much less as a change from Justice Kavanaugh’s
earlier positions. Justice Kavanaugh’s most significant statement on
agencies’ relationship with the Court more generally is his dissent from
denial of certiorari in Paul v. United States, in which he urges adoption
of a more robust nondelegation doctrine, as advocated in Justice
Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent.359 In this dissent, he echoes his existing
355. Brett Kavanaugh, Judge, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for D.C., The Joseph Story
Distinguished Lecture: Address at the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 25, 2017), https://
www.heritage.org/josephstory2017; see also Walker, supra note 346 (quoting a relevant part
of the lecture and discussing implications for Chevron).
356. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 520.
357. See Barnett et al., supra note 340.
358. PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2056–
57 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
359. 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“I write separately because Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further
consideration in future cases.”).
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concerns with agencies that “exercise regulatory authority over a major
policy question of great economic and political importance” and citing in
support UARG, Brown & Williamson, and MCI.360 This suggests a close
connection between nondelegation and the major questions doctrine that
should chill any ambitious regulator to the bone. As Andy Hessick has
put it, “Chevron is just a battle, and nondelegation is the war.” 361 That
said, the implications for Chevron specifically are yet unclear.
It is impossible to be sure how Justice Kavanaugh would vote if given
the opportunity to overturn Chevron, even harder to guess than with
Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, who have made their opposition clear. But
Justice Kavanaugh’s record does make it clear that he supports
continuing the long process of constraining and weakening Chevron.
Limiting Chevron to “broad and open-ended terms,” as he suggested in
his Harvard Law Review Article, except for “major rules” as he suggested
in United States Telecom Association v. FCC, would push that narrowing
project even further than it has gone already.362 It might not make much
difference in practice, given the low rate of deference to agency
interpretations already evident on the Court, but it would make
Chevron’s decline more obvious.
4. Outside Voices
Chevron has always had its critics.363 But that criticism has increased
notably in recent years,364 likely driven by, and possibly itself driving, the
critiques within the Court. Cass Sunstein has characterized Chevron as

360. Id.
361. Andy Hessick (@AndyHessick), TWITTER (Feb. 28, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://
twitter.com/AndyHessick/status/1233459391346728960.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 347–49.
363. Among early academic criticisms, see generally, Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452
(1989). See also Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of
Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 761 (1991) (A “strong reading of
Chevron should be rejected because it is unconstitutional, represents poor political theory,
produces bad policy outcomes, and rests on shaky doctrinal foundations. Chevron is based
on two questionable premises . . . .”).
364. Christopher J. Walker, The Federalist Society’s Chevron Deference Dilemma, L. &
LIBERTY (Apr. 3, 2018), https://lawliberty.org/the-federalist-societys-chevron-deferencedilemma/ (“In recent years, there has been a growing call to eliminate Chevron deference.
This call has come from the Hill, the federal bench, and the legal academy. Last year it was
front and center during the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing on Neil Gorsuch’s
nomination to the Supreme Court.”).
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“under siege.”365 Criticism has come from academics,366 interest
groups,367 and even Congress itself.368 Some states have recently moved
to reject deference to agency interpretations of statutes in state courts, 369
though others never recognized it.370 Some of its critics called for Chevron
to be rejected entirely,371 while others called for it to be retained but
further constrained.372 Christopher Walker has compiled an exhaustive
literature review of these critiques,373 so it is not necessary to do so here
in detail.
Combined with the decline of deference at the Court itself, these
external critiques make it appear that Chevron has reached a critical
moment. Some have speculated that it might be overturned. 374 For
reasons explored in Part V below, in my view that is unlikely. But open
criticism of the doctrine further erodes its power and significance; it
exposes publicly what has been true at the Court for at least a decade.
Deference is dead.

365. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1615 (2019).
366. See generally, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779
(2010); see also Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the
Law of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1160–61 (2019) (arguing stare decisis should
not be a barrier to overturning Chevron).
367. See, e.g., Joseph Postell & Paul Larkin Jr., Not Above the Law: Ending the
Misguided Chevron–Auer Deference Regime, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://
www.heritage.org/courts/report/not-above-the-law-ending-the-misguided-chevron-auerdeference-regime.
368. See Brent Owen, U.S. Congress Considers Law That Would Overturn Chevron
Deference, 6 NAT’L L. REV., no. 224, Aug. 11, 2016, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/uscongress-considers-law-would-overturn-chevron-deference.
369. See Daniel M. Ortner, The End of Deference: The States That Have Rejected
Deference, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://
www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-end-of-deference-the-states-that-have-rejected-deference-bydaniel-m-ortner/ (“[W]hile the Supreme Court has chosen incremental reform rather than
a more dramatic rejection of deference, several states in recent years have made a different
and more dramatic decision. At least seven state supreme courts have issued decisions that
decisively reject Chevron or Auer like deference. And two more states have rejected
deference via legislation or referendum.”).
370. See id. (describing Delaware as “a longtime skeptic of deference”).
371. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 366, at 779.
372. See Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 MO.
L. REV. 1095, 1104–05 (2016); see also Adler, supra note 11, at 984–85.
373. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 110–20 (2018).
374. See generally Valerie C. Brannon & Jared P. Cole, Deference and its Discontents:
Will the Supreme Court Overrule Chevron?, CONG. RSCH. SERV.: LEGAL SIDEBAR (Oct. 11,
2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10204 (discussing predictions
that Chevron will be overturned).
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D. Effects of Chevron’s Decline at Agencies
Before exploring what the death of deference at the Court means for
the future, it is worth briefly exploring what it has meant for agencies so
far. To what extent, if any, may agencies still count on deference to their
interpretations of statutes?
Some recent opinions suggest they cannot count on it at all. BNSF is
particularly illustrative: the majority does not cite Chevron or discuss
deference, instead simply interpreting the statute in light of past Court
precedent; it effectively applies de novo review.375 As Justice Gorsuch
notes in his dissent, Chevron deference was almost absent from
consideration of the case, from briefs through oral argument and in the
opinion:
In the past, the briefs and oral argument in this case likely would
have centered on whether we should defer to the IRS’s
administrative interpretation. . . . But . . . BNSF devoted
scarcely any of its briefing to Chevron. At oral argument, BNSF’s
lawyer didn’t even mention the case until the final seconds—and
even then “hate[d] to cite” it. No doubt, BNSF proceeded this way
well aware of the mounting criticism of Chevron deference. And
no doubt, too, this is all to the good. Instead of throwing up our
hands and letting an interested party—the federal government’s
executive branch, no less—dictate an inferior interpretation of
the law that may be more the product of politics than a
scrupulous reading of the statute, the Court today buckles down
to its job of saying what the law is in light of its text, its context,
and our precedent. Though I may disagree with the result the
Court reaches, my colleagues rightly afford the parties before us
an independent judicial interpretation of the law. They deserve
no less.376
In this sense, BNSF is a post-Chevron case. Chevron’s weakness,
driven by its descent into muddy indeterminacy, has spilled out into the
open. Once the key citation at the core of many administrative law cases,
upon which the outcome depended, Chevron appears to have become a
case litigants “hate to cite.” Sometimes the Court may consider deference
sua sponte despite no party actually asking for it, but in such cases, the
agency’s refusal to request deference appears to make the Court less
375.
376.

See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 900–04 (2019).
Id. at 908–09 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
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willing to grant it.377 Such “Chevron waiver,” if it becomes regular
practice or Court doctrine, creates a deference death spiral. Agencies are
less likely to cite Chevron, either because they do not think it will do
much good or because it actively repels some Justices, and as a result
deference could be waived even if the Court might otherwise have been
willing to grant it.378
Continued refusal by the Court or parties to cite Chevron in cases
where it should doctrinally be relevant will make it much more difficult
to assess future trends in Chevron’s significance. The Justices will notice
its absence, of course, as with Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Little
Sisters of the Poor in which she notes puzzlement at the majority’s
omission of Chevron in the kind of case that in her view it was “built
for.”379 But casual observers of the Court, or specialists in fields other
than administrative law, may not. If litigants do hate to cite Chevron,
that will create problems for research as well. Salmanowitz and
Spamann’s work on how often the Court applies Chevron is based on
using parties’ briefs to determine when Chevron is relevant; they assume
that “[i]f neither party argued for Chevron deference, then the case is not
plausibly a Chevron case.”380 That seems like an entirely reasonable
assumption, unless parties are refusing to cite Chevron because they fear
annoying its opponents on the Court or think space in briefs is better
used on arguments more likely to determine the outcome of the case. Like
astronomers in a rapidly expanding universe, we may be living in the last
era in which the subject of our study is observable.
Other evidence for agency response to decline in deference at the
Court is inconclusive. The largest effect might be hidden: as noted above,
a robust Chevron empowers agencies to interpret statutes more boldly; a
weakened, narrowed, and muddied Chevron does the reverse. Agencies
might react to the decline of deference by interpreting statutes more
narrowly or by not regulating at all in areas of statutory ambiguity. But
because we only see the products of rulemaking, not internal
377. See, e.g., Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020) (seeming
to deny Chevron deference in part because the S.G. had not requested it, though Justice
Breyer’s discussion of deference is somewhat cryptic); see also Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 789–90 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he government expressly waived reliance on
Chevron. . . . This Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the
government fails to invoke it.”).
378. But see Hickman, supra note 290 (arguing the Court has not adopted Chevron
waiver and is not likely to do so).
379. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2397 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring).
380. Salmanowitz & Spamann, supra note 17878, at 83.
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deliberations, any decline in agency ambition would be hard or
impossible to observe.
In a recent paper, Daniel Hornung describes how wariness about
application of the major questions doctrine affected agency deliberations
during formulation of the Clean Power Plan, aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants.381 Based on this experience,
he concludes that expansion of the doctrine—and therefore denial of
Chevron deference—will have a negative effect on agencies.382 “If the
courts continue to rely on the major questions doctrine, the critical role
agency lawyers play within these rulemaking processes will deteriorate
further, leading to less deliberative processes and statutory
interpretation that is less comprehensive.”383 More research on internal
agency assumptions about and reactions to declining Chevron deference,
potentially including interviews of agency general counsel, would be a
valuable research project.
A look at the observable output of agencies—rulemakings—shows
some changes in treatment of Chevron over time and across presidential
administrations, but no clear trends. On the one hand, citations of
Chevron in economically significant rulemakings have clearly and
sharply declined in recent years; only five such rulemakings cite Chevron
since 2017.384 In 2017 and 2018, not a single significant rulemaking cited
Chevron; this had not happened since at least before 1995. 385
But a broader view suggests there is no clear trend away from agency
appeal to Chevron deference. Considering all rulemakings, not just
economically significant ones, citations of Chevron were low in 2017–18
at five citations but substantially higher in 2019 and 2020. 386 Even if
there is a real decline in the rate at which Chevron is cited in significant
rulemakings, that might not be a signal of declining relevance of the

381. See Daniel Hornung, Note, Agency Lawyers’ Answers to the Major Questions
Doctrine, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 759, 771, 776–78 (2020).
382. Id. at 762.
383. Id.
384. Nathan Richardson, Chevron Citations in Rulemakings (Public), GOOGLE SHEETS,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/11wDygZyJ8NQv7BINV5z5k99DEw0pG3Jr07ZE8k4cp
GU/edit?usp=sharing (Oct. 28, 2020). Data was obtained via a search of final rules in the
Federal Register citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This search
is likely to be slightly overinclusive, to the extent it includes any rulemakings citing
Chevron for substantive Clean Air Act precedent, rather than as a deference doctrine. The
Federal Register has data searchable back to 1994; 1995 is the first full year included. See
FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
385. Id.
386. Id. During 2020, the twenty-two citations are the highest in any year back to at
least 1995. Id.
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doctrine at the Court so much as antipathy toward Chevron specifically
or the regulatory state generally among Trump administration
leadership.387 The Trump administration has also issued fewer
rulemakings and fewer significant rulemakings than past
administrations, so some decline in the raw number of citations to
Chevron is to be expected.388 Indeed the rate of such citations, i.e. the
share of rulemakings citing Chevron, has not changed much across
presidential administrations since at least the mid-1990s, from when
searchable Federal Register data is available. Nor is there much of a
long-term trend, though there is substantial year-to-year fluctuation.389

Figure 1390

387. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017).
388. See Richardson, supra note 384.
389. See infra Figures 1–2.
390. Richardson, supra note 384.
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Figure 2391
If agency citations to Chevron in rulemakings had appreciably
declined, that would have been additional evidence that its predictive
power and doctrinal influence had declined, though the anti-regulatory
sentiment of the Trump administration would be a plausible alternative
cause. Indeed, one might not expect to see any drop in agency citations
until quite recently, despite the long-term decline in Chevron’s influence
at the Court. It is possible that Chevron’s weakness did not become clear
until high-profile losses by the Obama administration at the Supreme
Court in Chevron cases like Michigan and victories despite denial of
deference in others like King.392 It is also possible that President Obama’s
ambitious regulatory agenda in the face of a recalcitrant Congress in
most of his time in office required agencies to continue to rely on Chevron
deference even as they became aware that it was not much help. 393
Another reason agency citations to Chevron might not decline even
as deference has declined at the Supreme Court is that, as Barnett and
Walker have found, Chevron retains influence in the lower courts. 394 Not
all agency rules are challenged in court, and when they are, those
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id.
See supra Sections IV.A.3–4.
See Metzger, supra note 387, at 3 & n.7.
See Barnett & Walker, supra note 14, at 29.
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challenges are usually resolved in the lower courts.395 To the extent
rulemakings are speaking to courts on matters of statutory
interpretation, they are primarily defending against challenges there, at
least outside of the highest-profile actions that agencies may assume will
eventually reach the Supreme Court. Or perhaps agencies are just going
through the motions, citing Chevron more out of habit than hope.
An alternative measure of agency reliance on Chevron might be found in
the frequency of Chevron citations in their briefs, or those of the S.G., in
cases before the Court. As discussed above, there are at least a few recent
cases in which the agency or S.G. does not advance Chevron deference
arguments,396 and one case—County of Maui—in which Justice Breyer
raised the issue sua sponte.397 Extracting evidence of a trend from agency
briefs is likely to be difficult, however. First, as the debate between
Eskridge/Baer and Salmanowitz/Spamann illustrates, 398 it is hard to
identify the universe of cases in which Chevron deference is applicable,
i.e. the denominator. Salmanowitz & Spamann’s method for escaping this
meta-interpretive quagmire, reference to the agency and S.G. briefs, is of
no use if the briefs themselves are the subject of inquiry.399 Second, the
reasons for agency refusal to cite Chevron might also be tied up with the
specific facts of the case; for example, an agency might change its
position, muddying the deference inquiry. And finally, there just are not
that many Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases. Any evidence
uncovered from briefs would have to come with substantial caveats about
sample size bias.
It may be, therefore, that there is an evidentiary gap. The large
number of rulemakings makes for a robust data set, but it is not very
useful for observing effects of changes in deference at the Court because
those rulemakings are only secondarily or tertiarily, if at all, concerned
with Supreme Court litigation. Briefs in Supreme Court cases are
obviously only concerned with appealing to the Court, but there may not
be enough of them to draw any conclusions, though as noted above
reluctance to cite Chevron makes identifying the universe of briefs to
examine difficult. Nevertheless, exploration of briefs in recent cases is
likely a valuable qualitative research project.
Whether or not agencies rely on Chevron deference in their internal
planning, if they expect an interpretive question to reach the Supreme

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See id. at 73.
See text accompanying notes 376–85.
Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474–75 (2020).
See discussion supra Section III.D.
See Salmanowitz & Spamann, supra note 178, at 82–83.
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Court, they rely on it. Seeking deference at the Court as an agency
increasingly resembles a cruelly designed game: deference is supposedly
available, but the list of exceptions, carve-outs, and interpretive canons,
some explicit and some unstated, is so mind-numbingly extensive and
vague that in practice meaningful deference is unavailable. I am
increasingly sympathetic to administrative law students who learn
“official” Chevron and its two steps, spend weeks learning various
exceptions and reading cases that set inconsistent boundaries, and then
decide they can do little but throw up their hands and go through the
motions on the exam. Agency lawyers who think their interpretations are
likely to reach the Court likely feel the same way. This is no mere
technical change. It substantially constrains the power of the executive
branch, just as Chevron expanded it.400
E. Why?
Why is Chevron under such attack, and why has deference declined so
much at the Court? Three factors seem most important.
1. Anti-Administrativism
First, the decline of deference is part of a wider rhetorical and
ideological anti-administrative shift on the Court. In Gillian Metzger’s
view, this trend has become sufficiently ascendant that the
administrative state can be described as “under siege,” with battles over
the scope of administrative power once thought resolved in the New Deal
era now being refought.401 For many critics of Chevron and architects of
its decline, the reduction in agency power is the point. Justices Thomas’s
and Gorsuch’s calls for Chevron to be reconsidered are explicitly
motivated by concern over agency authority.402 Justice Kavanaugh’s call

400. See generally Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the
Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141 (2012).
401. See Metzger, supra note 387, at 2–3.
402. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 763 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Should EPA wield its vast powers over electric utilities to protect public health? A pristine
environment? Economic security? . . . [W]e should be alarmed that it felt sufficiently
emboldened by those precedents to make the bid for deference that it did here.”); GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron
and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and
legislative power and concentrate federal power . . . .”).
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for it to be reformed and constrained is driven by similar institutional
concerns.403
Chevron itself was a deregulatory decision,404 but in shifting power
from courts to agencies Chevron allowed future administrations more
regulatory freedom. After Brown & Williamson and its progeny, agencies
are on notice that assertions of new authority will be met with skepticism
at best and outright hostility at worst from the Court. The suggestion
that an agency today might receive deference for a similarly bold
statutory reinterpretation seems laughably quaint. 405 The resulting
expansion or revival of the major questions doctrine is aimed directly at
constraining perceived excesses of agency power. The relative absence of
any parallel decline in deference in the lower courts might have similar
roots: cases that reach the Court are more likely to involve broad or
significant agency assertions of authority that alarm antiadministrativists, making them particularly unlikely to defer to agency
interpretations and making deference arguments advanced by other
Justices less likely to attract their votes.
This puts deference’s decline within a larger ideological project. As
Cass Sunstein notes, “[t]he current struggle over Chevron might well be
seen a proxy war in a larger battle over the legitimacy of the
administrative state, or perhaps as a significant skirmish in that
battle.”406 Attacking Chevron may not even be the most important part
of the anti-administrative project; the Court’s moves toward a revived
nondelegation doctrine407 and, perhaps, more robust hard-look review

403. See Kavanaugh, supra note 38, at 2151 (“We must recognize how much Chevron
invites an extremely aggressive executive branch philosophy of pushing the legal
envelope.”).
404. See Metzger, supra note 387, at 15 (“If anything, the Reagan era sowed the seeds
for what conservatives today view as executive overreach. It was the Reagan
Administration’s deregulatory efforts that produced the Chevron doctrine and deference to
an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes that it implements.”).
405. To be clear, by “bold” I mean an assertion of broad new authority, not interpretive
creativity. The FDA’s interpretation was a straightforward application of statutory text,
however big the regulatory change it would have wrought. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127 (2000).
406. Sunstein, supra note 365, at 1618.
407. In his Gundy dissent, Justice Gorsuch calls for a reinvigoration of the nondelegation
doctrine. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). He is joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts, while Justice Alito
writes separately but expresses sympathy for their views. See id. at 2131; id. at 1230 (Alito,
J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh took no part in Gundy but later indicated support for
Justice Gorsuch’s position in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Paul v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). This
indicates there are five votes on the court for a revived nondelegation doctrine, though we
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under the APA408 might do more in the long run to constrain agencies.
The track record of agencies in federal courts in recent years has been
extremely poor,409 though that is usually attributed more to the Trump
administration’s pairing of norm-breaking policy with a careless
approach to administrative details.410
It is noteworthy that opposition to Chevron deference on the Court
appears to have survived intact during a deregulatory presidential
administration.411 Deference to agencies under deregulatory leadership
leads to less regulation, though it does still shift power to agencies
relative to the courts. This suggests that views on Chevron have
hardened. Until and unless a change of heart or personnel on the Court
halts its anti-administrative turn, deference to agency interpretations
will remain rare.
2. Textualism
Another possible cause of deference’s decline is the parallel rise of
textualism to become the dominant mode of statutory interpretation, led
by Justice Scalia. The battles over interpretive methodology that
will likely soon see whether these five have the courage to pull that trigger when they are
in the majority, and what form a revived doctrine would take.
408. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (rejecting an
agency rulemaking on the grounds its stated rationale was pretextual).
409. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, N.Y.U. SCH. L.: INST. POL’Y
INTEGRITY, https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (Jan. 20, 2021) (tracking success
rate in administrative law cases; by its end, the administration had lost 80 percent of such
cases—148/185).
410. See, e.g., Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration
Is Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-isconstantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html (“[T]he
rulings so far paint a remarkable portrait of a government rushing to implement farreaching changes in policy without regard for long-standing rules against arbitrary and
capricious behavior.”).
411. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Two Futures for Administrative Law, YALE J. ON REGUL.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/two-futures-foradministrative-law-by-adrian-vermeule/. Vermeule had predicted either “a new coalition
between liberal lawyers and conservative lawyers in the courts, both deciding—for different
reasons—that the administrative law of the Obama era is too favorable to presidential
administration” or “a bewildering switch of places” between conservative and liberal
lawyers’ views on administrative law questions “but no major change in legal doctrine.” Id.
Neither prediction seems to have been entirely borne out; conservatives on the Court and
outside government have remained skeptical of administrative authority generally and
Chevron specifically, even if their views on executive power more broadly have shifted, and
vice versa for liberals. But cf. Sunstein, supra note 365, at 1619 (“With respect to Chevron,
the right and the left have switched sides.”).
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paralleled Chevron’s rise and fall412 are, for now, largely over. As Justice
Kagan famously remarked, “we’re all textualists now.” 413 At first glance,
this jurisprudential trend seems unrelated: Chevron’s innovation was to
require deference when there is statutory ambiguity, regardless of which
of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation are used to establish
whether ambiguity exists. Whether one wants a broad range of
interpretive tools or just one (text, in context), that wouldn’t seem to
change. But restricting the range of interpretive tools—textualism’s
essential project—means less ambiguity. That may seem paradoxical;
bringing more tools to bear on interpreting a statute should allow more
interpretive work to be done, resolving more ambiguity, right? In
practice, no; because different sources of statutory meaning—text,
context, purpose, legislative history, etc.—may point in different
directions, a smaller set of tools will often produce greater certainty, not
less.
Textualist analysis may also lead itself rhetorically to more conclusive
claims of statutory meaning. If judges must consider multiple, sometimes
contradictory, lines of evidence, their written opinions must then balance
those often-conflicting sources to reach a conclusion about a statute’s best
meaning. Purely textualist analysis is perhaps more likely to result in a
single definitive statement about a statute’s meaning. This is somewhat
of an oversimplification; even committed textualists acknowledge that
multiple lines of evidence of meaning are available within textualism,
including context and, perhaps, statements of statutory purpose. 414 Linda
Jellum identified the relationship between textualism’s rise and
Chevron’s decline significantly earlier, writing in 2006 that “[a]s the
Court embraced a textualist Chevron, it simultaneously adopted a more
intentional pre-step—step zero—and limited Chevron’s application.”415
In any case, the result on a textualist-dominant Court is that much or all
of the statutory interpretation action happens in Chevron Step One, as
the cases discussed above illustrate. In the last five terms, nine or ten of
the fifteen Supreme Court Chevron cases have been resolved by finding

412. See generally Jellum, supra note 9.
413. See Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.
414. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 515; see also Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302,
316–19 (2014) (adopting different operative definitions of the same text in the same statute
depending on context).
415. See Jellum, supra note 9, at 781 (alteration in original).
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a definitive interpretation of the statute,416 making the agency’s reading
and any deference due to it irrelevant.
Textualism may not have this effect on deference forever. Textualism
seems to be on the way to losing whatever political valence it may have
once had, as Justice Gorsuch’s textualist approach in extending the
protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to sexual orientation in
Bostock v. Clayton County illustrates.417 To use Carol Rose’s metaphor
again, once-crystalline textualism has, perhaps inevitably, been muddied
as it has become dominant. It is even possible that Chevron’s muddying
is merely an epiphenomenon of a larger contemporaneous jurisprudential
crystallization, which appears to have now peaked and begun its own
muddying. I am no legal philosopher, however, and will not speculate any
further than that.
3. Inherent Instability
Finally, the seeds of Chevron’s decline may have been within it the
whole time. Carol Rose’s core insight embodied in the crystals and mud
framework is that crystalline rules are inherently unstable. 418 Their
muddying over time is normal, expected, and perhaps inevitable.
Chevron seems particularly vulnerable to muddying. As noted above, it
is a judge-made doctrine that reduces judicial power and requires judges
to accept statutory interpretations that they view as suboptimal. Judges
will inevitably chafe under its restrictions. Justice Breyer noted this
source of instability in 1986, just two years after Chevron was decided. 419
Viewed in isolation, the Court’s move away from Chevron’s initial clarity
is radical, even if gradual. But perhaps it should not be so surprising.
Chevron is almost as old to us today as the APA was when Chevron was
decided. Chevron had a good run. And its muddying decline was probably
baked in from the beginning. As Rose suggests, the evolution from
416. See discussion and Table 1 infra Section IV.B.
417. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When the express terms
of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no
contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).
418. See Rose, supra note 15, at 595.
419. See Breyer, supra note 22, at 379 (“[N]either a strict view of Chevron, nor any other
strictly defined verbal review formula requiring deference to an agency’s interpretation of
law can prove successful in the long run [because] such a formula asks judges to develop a
cast of mind that often is psychologically difficult to maintain. It is difficult, after having
examined a legal question in depth with the object of deciding it correctly, to believe both
that the agency’s interpretation is legally wrong, and that its interpretation is reasonable.
More often one concludes that there is a ‘better’ view of the statute for example, and that
the ‘better’ view is ‘correct,’ and the alternative view is ‘erroneous.’”).
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crystals to mud and back is cyclical, with the seeds of each change
planted in the previous one.420
That cyclical story matches Chevron’s rise and fall. The imprecision
and unpredictability of Skidmore-era deference decisions cried out for a
clarifying rule, which Chevron supplied or was drafted into. Perhaps
inevitably, the rule soon came under attack for its failure to account for
circumstance. Early on, it was claimed that deferring to agency
interpretations of criminal statutes violates important norms, including
the rule of lenity. Then, it was claimed that deference should not allow
agencies to make sweeping changes to major areas of policy—Brown &
Williamson. And surely deference should not be available for smallpotatoes agency decisions without much process—Mead. Perhaps each of
these, and the myriad other exceptions to Chevron, can be defended on
its own merits, but the trend is clear and the result is a muddied doctrine
that has lost whatever power it once had.
Implicit erosions of Chevron have followed a similar pattern. Judges
over time created more and more discretionary authority within the
threshold ambiguity inquiry, Step One, and unsurprisingly the outcomes
usually tracked judges’ preferences. The major question exception is an
initially implicit restriction on Chevron that over time became explicit.
Indeed, the seeds of Chevron’s internal, implicit erosion were embedded
from the beginning. By giving judges the power to decide in Step One
which cases were within Chevron’s zone of deference, the doctrine gave
them the power to chip away at the crystal. In essence, Chevron locked
judges into a cell, but handed them the keys. As noted above, there was
probably no alternative, at least absent congressional action. But because
of this internal contradiction, a permanently crystalline range of Chevron
deference was never plausible.
In an earlier paper, I argued that this tension meant that the major
questions doctrine should be valued by defenders of agency authority, not
criticized as it typically is.421 Because judges will find it particularly
difficult to defer to agency statutory interpretations in high-profile and
high-stakes major questions cases, separating these cases from the
mainline of Chevron jurisprudence avoids setting precedent that
undercuts deference more generally—an example is the continued
expansion of judges’ power at Step One, Brown & Williamson-style.422 In
light of the general decline in deference at the Court documented here, I
am no longer convinced that view on the major questions doctrine is
420.
421.
422.

See infra Parts II–III.
See Richardson, supra note 158, at 423.
Id. at 421–25.
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correct. This is not because the Court is relying too frequently on the
major questions doctrine—it remains rarely cited, at least explicitly,
though adoption of Justice Kavanaugh’s major rules version would
change that. Instead, there just is not much mainline Chevron deference
to protect, at least at the Supreme Court. In the lower courts, where
meaningful deference persists, the major questions doctrine has never
much been applied; it is largely a Supreme Court-only doctrine.423
Alternatively, it is possible to view Chevron’s instability not as an
independent cause of its decline, but as the means by which other forces,
such as anti-administrativism and the rise of textualism, were able to
bring about that decline. Crystals do not just become mud on their own;
they yield to external pressure brought to bear on their inherent
contradictions. Under this view, Chevron’s inherent instability is the
most important factor in its decline but not the primary cause.
V. CHEVRON’S FUTURE
If Chevron has lost most of its influence and power and is under open
attack from multiple Justices, one might conclude that it is likely to be
overruled. Many scholars and observers have done so.424 A weak Chevron
seems vulnerable to a killing blow, and critics may smell blood in the
water. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch appear ready to reject Chevron
today. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh have shown some similar
inclinations, though their views are less clear. Chief Justice Roberts’s
dissent in City of Arlington shows deep concern with Chevron in some
circumstances, though it stops well short of indicating an appetite to
overrule it. Nevertheless, it is not hard to count to five votes here.
A. Rejection?
I do not think the Court is likely to overrule Chevron any time soon,
however. The Supreme Court does not overrule cases lightly and is
particularly unlikely to overrule a precedent with the name recognition
and perceived importance of Chevron. But stare decisis protects the name
423. Justice Kavanaugh’s “major rules” statement in U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855
F.3d 381, 420–22 (2017) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (per curiam), is a notable
exception, but it is in dissent of denial of en banc review, not a merits opinion. The doctrine
is rarely invoked, but this is not to suggest that it never is. See Hornung, supra note 38181,
at 762, 783–84 & nn.115–19 (identifying nine invocations of the doctrine in the lower courts
since UARG in 2014).
424. See generally Brannon & Cole, supra note 37474 (summarizing and referencing a
wide variety of predictions of Chevron’s demise). See also Sunstein, supra note 365, at 1622.
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of precedent more than its content. The principle has not protected
Chevron from the erosion discussed above. This is not an unfamiliar
pattern—the Court frequently limits the scope of precedent without
overruling it; in the extreme, a case may be “limited to its facts,”
overruled in all but name. As one scholar describes a doctrinal shift in
the opposite direction, from mud to crystal, in another area of law:
Given the Supreme Court’s adherence to the minimum contacts
language for seventy years now, it seems unlikely that the
vocabulary will soon change. The question rather is whether the
vocabulary will continue to be a cloak to hide jurisdictional
doctrine that is in truth no less rigid than that of the nineteenth
and early twentieth century. The minimum contacts test is in its
twilight because it has become almost completely separated from
the fairness rationale that underlay the test as it was originally
conceived. So while the minimum contacts language will almost
certainly persist, the test as a meaningful exposition of the Due
Process Clause may not live to see the next dawn, if indeed it is
still alive at all.425
I predict this is where Chevron is headed; as litigants and Justices
themselves recognize the decline in Chevron’s power and influence, it will
likely play a smaller role in briefs, oral arguments, and opinions.
To illustrate the same point in the opposite direction, it is widely
believed that applying Chevron deference substantially constrains
judges’ role in a case. Then-Judge Gorsuch argues as much in his
Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence:
Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the
abdication of the judicial duty. Of course, some role remains for
judges even under Chevron. At Chevron step one, judges decide
whether the statute is “ambiguous,” and at step two they decide
whether the agency’s view is “reasonable.” But where in all this
does a court interpret the law and say what it is? When does a
court independently decide what the statute means and whether
it has or has not vested a legal right in a person? Where Chevron
applies that job seems to have gone extinct.426

425. Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL
CIR. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
426. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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This is a good description of the textbook understanding of Chevron
and was perhaps how it worked in practice in the 1990s, at least outside
the major questions line of cases and other early excisions, like criminal
cases. But the ever-growing list of judge-made exceptions to Chevron and
dramatic expansion in judicial power at Step One, detailed above, make
it a wildly inaccurate characterization of Chevron as applied at the Court
today. It serves Justice Gorsuch’s rhetorical purposes to characterize
Chevron as shackling judges, but it has not meaningfully done so in a
long time at the Supreme Court, at least since Brown & Williamson, and
in some areas of law—including criminal—far longer than that. As the
Court’s Chevron cases decided in the last few years illustrate, Justices
have ample power to control the flow of a Chevron case through the two—
or three—step framework and reach any outcome a majority supports.
This increase in judges’ power and flexibility under Chevron and the
corresponding reduction in power and predictability for agencies makes
formal rejection of the doctrine less likely, not more. Why spend the time,
effort, or political capital to formally overrule a decision that has little
impact today?427 If the goal of Chevron’s critics is to shift interpretive
authority from agencies back to courts, that has largely been achieved
already, at least at the Supreme Court level. To tie Chevron’s future to
the reasons for its decline discussed in the previous section, the antiadministrativists need not overturn it if it no longer meaningfully
empowers agencies and textualists need not overturn it as they have
already won their fight. The doctrine’s inherent instability has declined
as it has declined in influence and been muddied, riddled with exceptions.
To the extent that work remains to be done, there is no evidence that it
cannot be accomplished via the same methods that have eroded Chevron
deference already. It is easy to imagine a future for Chevron in which it
persists but continues to shrink in significance.
B. Continued Decline
If Chevron is not overturned explicitly, then what? Predictions are, of
course, dangerous and usually wrong. But having made one already that
Chevron will not be overruled anytime soon, I am emboldened to
speculate. Broadly speaking, implicit and explicit erosion of Chevron is

427. I have made a similar prediction for similar reasons that Massachusetts will not be
overturned, despite criticism. See Nathan Richardson, The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act
Climate Policy, 10 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 104),
https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/wqy93/.
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likely to continue. The trend for the foreseeable future is most likely more
mud, not crystal.
One possibility is that it fades away silently. Chevron will be given lip
service at best. Some Justices will cite Chevron less often; when they do,
it will be with some reluctance, to buttress an opinion in which the agency
wins a close case. Other Justices will not cite Chevron at all in their
majority opinions, a practice some on the Court appear to have already
adopted: Little Sisters from the 2020 term, discussed briefly above, is a
good illustration of what might become the norm.428 Justice Thomas, fiery
in his criticism of Chevron when writing separately, does not mention it
at all in his majority opinion.429 He does not just pull the punch, he
refuses to fight at all. This is no cowardice. Chevron just is not that
important. One can imagine a future in which fewer opinions even bother
to cite Chevron and go through the process of siting their statutory
analysis within its Step One. Instead, their authors will just do the
analysis and move on. Chevron’s defenders, like Justice Kagan, will
presumably continue to cite it and purport to apply the framework, but
will rarely if ever be able to command a majority for opinions in which
deference is outcome-determinative. When not outcome-determinative,
citation of Chevron will prompt the by now standard outrage from its
critics in dissent or separate concurrence. But that need never mature
into critique, much less rejection, in a majority opinion. Decades of battle
over the scope and impact of Chevron will have been reduced to theater.
Another possibility is that explicit doctrinal change does happen, but
by continuing erosion of Chevron at the margins, rather than by
overturning it. This could come in a variety of explicit forms. For
example, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in City of Arlington advocating
a Chevron exception for “jurisdictional” interpretive questions might
become the majority position in a future case, without Justice Scalia on
the Court to hold the line.430 Or the form of agencies’ Chevron arguments
might be constrained, such as by forcing them to adopt a single
interpretation of statutory text, rather than arguing in the alternative
that it is either clearly in their favor or ambiguous but within the scope
of deference. The Court could also state clearly that Chevron deference is
only available to procedurally complete agency decisions, such as noticeand-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication. This has, after Mead,
been strongly implied but not formally required. The Court could also
428. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2397 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring).
429. See id. at 2372–86 (majority opinion).
430. See Adler, supra note 11, at 993–94 (calling for City of Arlington to be rejected).
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overturn NCTA v. Brand X insofar as that case allows agencies to
overrule judicial interpretations of statutes, as that decision’s author,
Justice Thomas, has recently called for.431
Alternatively, Chevron’s decline might continue silently. The Court
might just further expand the scope of existing exceptions to Chevron.
The major questions doctrine could grow as future cases steadily create
precedent increasing its scope—it is relatively easy to argue the doctrine
should be applied to a case that is only slightly less major than the
previous lower bound, especially because the criteria that make a case
major are never defined. Or the Court could be even more aggressive than
it has already become at ferreting out statutory meaning, leaving no
cases of statutory ambiguity in which agencies get interpretive deference.
As Justice Scalia pointed out more than thirty years ago, Chevron is
irrelevant if it only applies when interpretive questions are in true
equipoise, as that never happens in practice.432 Justice Kavanaugh’s
claim that he is willing to decide cases at Step One when he is only
“60/40” certain of a statute’s meaning points in this direction.433 It is easy
to imagine a future in which Chevron deference remains nominally
available but is never granted in practice because every case can be
disposed of at Step Zero or Step One. It does not matter much if a dish is
on a restaurant menu if the kitchen is closed or always out of a necessary
ingredient.
In short, the long process of Chevron’s muddying could continue;
however weak Chevron is now, the number of potential explicit
exclusions and incremental moves to broaden Step One is infinite.
Eventually, Supreme Court doctrine in agency statutory interpretation
cases may become indistinguishable from Skidmore’s multifactor
deference test. This is not to say an imperial court will ignore agencies
entirely; agencies will still get “deference” in that their arguments are—
sometimes—taken more seriously than those of other litigants, but there
will no longer be a deference rule. Crystals to mud.
C. Holding the Line
A final possibility, suggested by Cass Sunstein, is that Chevron could
be re-crystallized, but with an explicitly narrower scope; as he puts it,
Chevron could be “domesticated.”434 Judicial primacy in determining
431. See Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 694–95 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
432. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 520.
433. Kavanaugh, supra note 355.
434. See Sunstein, supra note 365, at 1622.
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whether statutory ambiguity exists, i.e. Step One, could be clarified—
including a more sharply defined major questions doctrine, the menu of
interpretive canons could be clearly established, and the scope of
deference available at Step Two could be more clearly defined. 435 This
domestication could come in a Supreme Court opinion or, conceivably,
from Congress.436
The Court has already taken a very similar approach in constraining
and crystallizing the related Auer/Seminole Rock doctrine regarding
deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations.437 In Kisor
v. Wilkie, Justice Kagan announced a five-factor test for when deference
would be available.438 But these factors are not really new 439 and are
quite similar to Sunstein’s suggestions for Chevron. Deference is only
available where judges determine the regulation at issue is “genuinely
ambiguous” after applying “‘traditional tools’ of construction.”440 The
agency’s interpretation must also be “reasonable,” reflect the agency’s
“authoritative . . . position” and “fair and considered judgment,” and lie
within its “substantive expertise.”441 All of these factors have Chevron
parallels: Step One, Step Two, the Mead exception, the stay-in-your-lane
principle, and the exception for mere litigating positions. 442 Kisor clarifies
that these apply in the context of agency interpretations of regulations,
while collecting and systematizing them. Kisor also suggests, though it
does not say, that its list of factors is complete443; if a reason not to grant
deference cannot be found in the five-factor test, deference applies—
though of course the Court could add to the list later. In this sense, it is
a recrystallization of Auer deference.
Could the same be done for Chevron? Maybe. On one hand, it is less
necessary; as noted, all of Kisor’s factors already exist in the Chevron
context. One view of Kisor is that all it really did was clarify that
Chevron’s steps, exceptions, and limitations applied to Auer deference,
too. Doing the same for deference to agency interpretations of statutes
would just be a restatement, not a recrystallization. On the other hand,

435. Id. at 1672–78.
436. See id. at 1676–77.
437. See Matthew A. Melone, Kisor v. Wilkie: Auer Deference Is Alive but Not So Well. Is
Chevron Next?, 12 NE. U. L. REV. 581, 610 (2020).
438. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–18 (2019).
439. More precisely, they may be new in the Auer context, but all already existed in the
Chevron context.
440. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
441. Id. at 2415–17.
442. See supra Part III.
443. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408.
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many observers believed Auer would be overturned in Kisor. The fact that
it was not is probably due to Justice Kagan’s efforts in producing a robust
list of exclusions and limitations sufficient to satisfy at least some of the
Justices with objections to the doctrine. A similar process might save
Chevron and even, to the extent that it recrystallizes the doctrine,
forestall further erosion. That certainly seems to be the thrust of
Sunstein’s proposal.
But even if that comes to pass, it is worth asking whether the rump
Chevron deference that it would preserve would really be deference at all.
No deference was available in Kisor because multiple factors took the
case outside of the scope of deference.444 It is possible that few if any
future cases involving agency interpretations of regulations will survive
application of the Kisor factors. Auer may be dead in all but name, Kisor
having killed it in a failed attempt to save it. The same could happen with
a Kisor-style restatement/recrystallization for Chevron, but in that case
it is not necessary to speculate whether much would be left of deference.
We can already observe from the Court’s Chevron cases that there is little
or no deference available anymore. At best, a restatement could only slow
the decline, not restore any lost deferential power—or, as seems to have
happened in Kisor, forestall a skeptical Court from overturning it. It is,
at best, a defensive approach.
One other possible future for Chevron, suggested by Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, is for it to become a lower courts-only doctrine.445 Deference would
be available in the federal district and appellate courts, but not at the
Supreme Court.446 This would de facto overrule Chevron at the Supreme
Court level and is perhaps the most radical shift in the doctrine short of
tossing it entirely. This approach has some virtues: it acknowledges and
accepts the current, sharp divergence between the level of deference
available at the Supreme Court and in lower courts. In doing so it
removes a source of doctrinal tension: Supreme Court cases denying
deference to agencies no longer risk confusing the lower courts or
unintentionally muddying Chevron doctrine there. In my view, such a
“hierarchically variable” 447 Chevron is unlikely. It probably would not
satisfy either Chevron’s proponents or its critics on the Court. In
particular, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh are unlikely to forget their

444. Id. at 2424 (declining to find Auer deference and remanding the issue of whether it
applied).
445. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency
Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727, 777–79 (2013).
446. See id.
447. See id. at 779.
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recent and documented frustration with deference as appellate judges
and condemn their erstwhile colleagues to defer to agency interpretations
that they would not. It would also increase the Court’s workload by
creating a class of cases that only it can properly resolve, though
overturning Chevron completely would probably increase that workload
even more, as the Court would face interminable statutory interpretation
circuit splits. But Bruhl’s suggestion cannot be ruled out. It may even be
the best available description of the status quo.
In short, there are many possible futures for Chevron deference, but
of these overturning it seems the least likely, despite being the most
discussed.
D. The Longer Term
This is not to suggest that criticism of Chevron will necessarily abate,
both within and outside the Court. It may: if BNSF becomes the model
and Chevron is frequently ignored, then there will be little need to
critique it. If the Court continues to at least play lip service to Chevron,
going through the two-step motions, then dissenting, or even concurring,
Justices and outside critics may of course blame Chevron and continue to
call for its rejection. But only if the majority actually grants deference
will these critiques have any weight. Recent cases suggest the Court will
rarely grant such deference anymore, though sample size is small,448 and
this seems unlikely to change. Until and unless it does, criticism of
Chevron will at least not increase in volume.
As noted above, Chevron deference continues to play a meaningful role
at the district court level.449 But decline of the doctrine at the Supreme
Court may eventually lead to decline in the lower courts too. Explicit
exclusions of classes of cases from Chevron’s scope are and will continue
to be followed by lower courts. Implicit weakening of Chevron, primarily
via liberal interpretation of Step One, will likely continue to create room
for lower courts to reject agency views in favor of their own preferred
readings of statutes.
Carol Rose’s framework is cyclical; it strongly suggests
recrystallization will happen eventually.450 Overturning Chevron would
in one sense further muddy the doctrine: agency statutory interpretation
cases would become slightly less predictable under a de novo or revived
Skidmore standard. But it would be a meta- or second-order
448.
449.
450.

See supra Table 1.
See Barnett & Walker, supra note 14, at 1, 29–31.
See Rose, supra note 15, at 595.
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recrystallization, in that it would at least clarify the Court’s deference
doctrine, if not the results. The same can be said for other future paths
for Chevron that explicitly reduce its scope as would overruling Brand X,
summarize and restate existing exclusions and limitations Kisor-style, or
limit it to lower courts. Each would add doctrinal but not interpretive
clarity.
Even if these predictions are right, they are unlikely to persist forever.
Over the longer term, as political and policy trends shift, and particularly
as the makeup of the Court changes, a revival of deference to agency
interpretations is plausible. Administrative law has never been stable for
long. The same desire for clarity and predictability that drove Chevron’s
adoption451 might again motivate a deference rule in agency statutory
interpretation cases. A change in the ideological balance of the Court
would certainly render any predictions made today almost useless. One
or both parties might change their position on deference again; or
pressing policy issues like climate change might make stronger
administrative government necessary, or at least raise its status with
elites enough to shift views on the Court. A new deference doctrine might
replace Chevron as Chevron replaced Skidmore, intentionally or
unintentionally.
Alternatively, Congress could act at any time, in either direction.
Chevron is based on, at least allegedly, an implied delegation of
interpretive authority by Congress to agencies. Congress could at any
point make this delegation explicit—generally, in some range of cases, or
only for a specific statute or statutes.
I make no predictions here about when or how a doctrinal
recrystallization might happen. Muddy legal doctrine can last a long
time—witness the long persistence of many of the Court’s multifactor
tests.452 But Carol Rose’s historical analysis suggests neither crystals nor
mud last forever.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though it may not have been intended to do so, Chevron rapidly,
though never completely, crystallized the degree of deference to agency

451. Or, more precisely, drove the Court to apply Chevron in rule-like fashion, whether
that was Justice Stevens’s intent or not. See supra note 46. A future recrystallization may
similarly not be immediately obvious when it happens.
452. See, e.g., Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(adopting a famed multifactor test for determining whether regulatory action is a
compensable taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment).
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interpretations of statutes in federal law. Across a wide range of cases
and similarly wide range of possible statutory interpretations, agencies
and judges had a clear mandate and a two-step roadmap for getting
there. Relative to the Skidmore test that preceded it, Chevron
crystallized deference doctrine and in doing so shifted power from judges
to agencies.
Almost immediately, however, that crystal began to yield. Classes of
cases were excluded from Chevron’s reach, and the court chipped away
at Chevron’s power and predictability by increasing the range of cases
that judges, or at least Justices, could decide. This process of muddying
accelerated in the early 2000s, most notably with the announcement of
the major questions doctrine in Brown & Williamson. It has only
accelerated since.
Today, agency statutory interpretations appear to get no meaningful
deference at all at the Supreme Court, though deference remains robust
in the lower courts, for now. Agencies have prevailed in only three of the
last fifteen Chevron cases, and none in the last three years.453 In only one
case over that period did the Court actually defer to an agency
interpretation. That holding prompted a Justice to call for Chevron to be
overturned. Two or possibly three further Justices have since called for
the doctrine to be substantially narrowed or rejected entirely, and similar
voices outside the Court have increased in volume. Deference is dead at
the Court; indeed, it has been on life support for some time, possibly since
Brown & Williamson two decades ago.
Chevron’s decline is driven in large part by a wider ideological project
skeptical of administrative authority and may also be a side-effect of the
rise to dominance of textualism over the same time period. But Chevron,
like all crystalline doctrines, was inherently unstable from the beginning.
Its decline should come as no surprise. Adrian Vermeule has argued that
the long arc of administrative law bends towards deference and that this
is a defining, positive feature.454 He may be right over the long term, but
if so, we are currently in a reactionary moment. Whether this is good or
bad depends on one’s policy and institutional priors and on how the Court
rules in unknown future cases. Just because deference is unavailable
does not mean agencies always lose, as King v. Burwell illustrates.
For some, Chevron’s decline in clarity and influence signals its
imminent demise. Instead, however, it is likely to persist, at least in
name. It remains influential on the lower courts. Even if there are
sufficient votes on the Court to overturn it, Chevron’s weakness means
453.
454.

See supra Table 1.
See generally VERMEULE, supra note 13.
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there is little reason for its opponents to spend the political and
institutional capital to overturn it. It is far easier to just criticize Chevron
in dissents and concurrences, discrediting it to the point where it becomes
a precedent litigants hate to cite and its remaining defenders on the
Court are reluctant to use.
Chevron is therefore likely to persist indefinitely, not because it or
deference generally is necessary or inevitable, but because it does not
matter very much anymore at the Court. In the short term, its decline
could be made obvious by a decision clearly stating its accumulated
exceptions and restrictions, as the Court did for related Auer deference
in Kisor. It could even be relegated to a doctrine for the lower courts only.
The evolution of crystal to mud is predictable but it is also cyclical. In the
more distant future, deference doctrine is likely to be recrystallized and
possibly restrengthened, shifting power back to agencies. But this seems
like a distant prospect from today’s perspective, likely requiring big
changes in personnel on the Court and wider shifts in American politics
and policy. Until then, at least at the Supreme Court, deference is dead,
though Chevron lives.

